Memory corruption vulnerabilities have been around for decades and rank among the most prevalent vulnerabilities in embedded systems. Yet this constrained environment poses unique design and implementation challenges that significantly complicate the adoption of common hardening techniques. Combined with the irregular and involved nature of embedded patch management, this results in prolonged vulnerability exposure windows and vulnerabilities that are relatively easy to exploit. Considering the sensitive and critical nature of many embedded systems, this situation merits significant improvement. In this work, we present the first quantitative study of exploit mitigation adoption in 42 embedded operating systems, showing the embedded world to significantly lag behind the generalpurpose world. To improve the security of deeply embedded systems, we subsequently present µArmor, an approach to address some of the key gaps identified in our quantitative analysis. µArmor raises the bar for exploitation of embedded memory corruption vulnerabilities, while being adoptable on the short term without incurring prohibitive extra performance or storage costs.
Abstract. Emulation-based network intrusion detection systems have been devised to detect the presence of shellcode in network traffic by trying to execute (portions of) the network packet payloads in an instrumented environment and checking the execution traces for signs of shellcode activity. Emulation-based network intrusion detection systems are regarded as a significant step forward with regards to traditional signature-based systems, as they allow detecting polymorphic (i.e., encrypted) shellcode. In this paper we investigate and test the actual effectiveness of emulation-based detection and show that the detection can be circumvented by employing a wide range of evasion techniques, exploiting weakness that are present at all three levels in the detection process. We draw the conclusion that current emulation-based systems have limitations that allow attackers to craft generic shellcode encoders able to circumvent their detection mechanisms.
Embedded devices are playing a major role in our way of life. Similar to other computer systems embedded devices are vulnerable to code-reuse attacks. Compromising these devices in a critical environment constitute a significant security and safety risk. In this paper, we present µShield, a memory corruption exploitation mitigation system for embedded COTS binaries with configurable protection policies that do not rely on any hardware-specific feature. Our evaluation shows that µShield provides its protection with a limited performance overhead.
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