Year after year, managers strive to improve financial performance and firm value through marketing actions such as new product introductions and promotional incentives. This study investigates the short-and long-term impact of such marketing actions on financial metrics, including top-line, bottom-line, and stock market performance. The authors apply multivariate time-series models to the automobile industry, in which both new product introductions and promotional incentives are considered important performance drivers. Notably, whereas both marketing actions increase top-line firm performance, their long-term effects strongly differ for the bottom line. First, new product introductions increase long-term financial performance and firm value, but promotions do not. Second, investor reaction to new product introduction grows over time, indicating that useful information unfolds in the first two months after product launch. Third, product entry in a new market yields the highest top-line, bottom-line, and stock market benefits. Managers may use these results to justify new product efforts and to weigh short-and longterm consequences of promotional incentives.

Under increased scrutiny from top management and shareholders, marketing managers feel the need to measure and communicate the impact of their actions on shareholder returns. In particular, how do customer value creation (through product innovation) and customer value communication (through marketing investments) affect stock returns? This paper examines conceptually and empirically how product innovations and marketing investments for such product innovations lift stock returns by improving the outlook on future cash flows. We address these questions with a large-scale econometric analysis of product innovation and associated marketing mix in the automobile industry. First, we find that adding such marketing actions to the established finance benchmark model greatly improves the explained variance in stock returns. In particular, investors react favorably to companies that launch pioneering innovations, with higher perceived quality, backed by substantial advertising support, in large and growing categories. Finally, we quantify and compare the stock return benefits of several managerial control variables. Our results highlight the stock market benefits of pioneering innovations. Compared to minor updates, pioneering innovations obtain a seven times higher impact on stock returns, and their advertising support is nine times more effective as well. Perceived quality of the new-car introduction improves the firm's stock returns while customer liking does not have a statistically significant effect. Promotional incentives have a negative effect on stock returns, suggesting that price promotions may be interpreted as a signal of demand weakness. Managers may combine these return estimates with internal data on project costs to help decide the appropriate mix of product innovation and marketing investment.

No abstract

No abstract

When buying durable goods, consumers must forecast how much utility they will derive from future consumption, including consumption in different states of the world. This can be complicated for consumers because making intertemporal evaluations may expose them to a variety of psychological biases such as present bias, projection bias, and salience effects. We investigate whether consumers are affected by such intertemporal biases when they purchase automobiles. Using data for more than 40 million vehicle transactions, we explore the impact of weather on purchasing decisions. We find that the choice to purchase a convertible or a four-wheel-drive is highly dependent on the weather at the time of purchase in a way that is inconsistent with classical utility theory. We consider a range of rational explanations for the empirical effects we find, but none can explain fully the effects we estimate. We then discuss and explore projection bias and salience as two primary psychological mechanisms that are consistent with our results.

Automobile manufacturers frequently use promotions involving cash incentives. While payments are nominally directed to either customers or dealers, the ultimate beneficiary of the promotion depends on the outcome of price negotiation. We use program evaluation methods to compare the incidence of these two types of promotions. Customers obtain 70 to 90 percent of a customer rebate, but only 30 to 40 percent of a dealer discount promotion, a $500 difference for a typical promotion. Our leading hypothesis is that pass-through rates differ because of information asymmetries: customer rebates are well-publicized to customers, while dealer discount promotions are not. (JEL D82, L11, L15, L62, L81, M31)

for helpful comments. The authors are particularly indebted to Meghan Busse for extensive comments and suggestions.

No abstract