We investigate the effects of entry of financial technology (FinTech) based firms on competition in the retail payments market. With a model of two-sided market with vertical restraints, we derive the following results. When only the entry of a vertically integrated (or end-to-end service) provider is allowed, either all merchants opt for multi-homing or no entry occurs, regardless of the regulatory requirement. On the other hand, if the entry of a downstream-only (or front-end service) provider is allowed, a partial multi-homing equilibrium could emerge under certain conditions, in which the entry of an end-to-end service provider does not occur. Without regulation, however, the vertically integrated incumbent does not voluntarily provide the back-end service to the entrant in general. This suggests the need for proper regulatory measures to reach a socially desirable outcome from the new entry in the retail payments market.

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), which are legal tenders in digital form, are expected to reduce currency issuance and circulation costs and broaden the scope of monetary policy. In addition, these currencies may also reduce consumers’ need for conventional demand deposits, which, in turn, increases banks’ loan provision costs because deposits require higher rates of return. We use a microeconomic banking model to investigate the effects of introducing an economy-wide, account-type CBDC on a bank’s loan supply and its failure risk. Given that a CBDC is expected to lower the cost of liquidity circulation and become a strong substitute for demand deposits, both the loan supply and the bank failure risk increase. These increases are countered by subsequent increases in the rates of return on term deposits and loans, which, in turn, reduce the loan supply and thus bank failure risk. These offsetting forces lead to no significant change in banking, as long as the rate of return on loans is below a certain threshold. However, once the rate is above the threshold, bank failure risk increases, thereby undermining banking stability. The problem is more pronounced when the degree of pass-through of funding costs to the loan rate is high and the profitability of a successful project is low. Our results imply that central banks wishing to introduce an economy-wide, account-type CBDC should first monitor yields on bank loans and consider policy measures that induce banks to maintain adequate liquidity reserve levels.

This study examined how the expansion of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending affects bank risks, particularly insolvency and illiquidity risks. We compared a benchmark case wherein banks are the only players in the loan market with a segmented market case wherein the loan market is segmented by borrowers’ creditworthiness, P2P lending platforms operate only in the low-credit market segment, and banks operate in both low- and high-credit segments. For the segmented market case compared with the benchmark one, we find that, while banks’ insolvency risk increases, their illiquidity risk decreases such that their overall risk also decreases. Our results imply that sustainable P2P lending requires an appropriate differentiation of roles between banks and P2P lending platforms—P2P lending platforms operate in the low-credit segment and banks’ involvement in P2P lending is restricted—so that the growth of P2P lending is not adverse for bank stability.

Motivated by recently introduced retail payment schemes using information technology, often called “FinTech,” we examine the effect of fraud liability regime on antifraud investment in a FinTech payment scheme, where the front‐end and back‐end services are vertically separated. In an environment where a FinTech payment service provider (FPP) covers only the front‐end services, delegating the back‐end services to an integrated payment service provider (IPP) such as banks and credit card companies, we show that under the IPP liability regime, the IPP invests more in general, while the respective investment depends on the range of the access fee under the FPP liability regime. Specifically, given a sufficiently great loss from accident, if the access fee is in a certain range, the FPP liability regime is superior in terms of antifraud investment. When the FPP makes its indirect revenue from its user base in addition to the revenue from user fees, we can observe greater antifraud investment under both liability regimes, but the overall decrease in fraud probability is higher under the IPP liability regime. Our results suggest that it might be desirable to induce FPP liability regime, which might necessitate regulating the access fee to achieve such an outcome. (JEL G23, G28, D43, L22)

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