PurposeUsing the panel data of 465 Taiwanese listed companies and taking into consideration endogeneity issues this paper aims to examine the influence of family ownership on firm performances.Design/methodology/approachThe use of a panel data set encompassing a five‐year period enables one to examine both cross‐sectional and within‐firm variations in the relationships between family ownership and firm performances. The paper also uses a simultaneous equation system to account for the endogeneity between family ownership and firm performances, and apply the quadratic equations to identify the percentage of family ownership that maximizes firm performance.FindingsWhen either a profitability indicator (ROA) or a valuation indicator (Tobin's Q) is applied, the empirical results show that family ownership positively affects firm performance. The results also show that the profitability of a firm (ROA) first increases and then decreases with family ownership. In other words, when families have more than 30 per cent control of the firm, the potential for entrenchment and poor performance becomes greater.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to examine the relationships between family ownership and firm performances, while simultaneously addressing the issue of endogeneity and identifying the optimal level of family ownership in Taiwanese firms. The finding that family ownership positively affects firm performance elucidates why a family firm is one of the most important business development models in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the finding that the percentage of family ownership should not exceed 30 per cent to avoid the occurrence of poor performance also suggests that excessive family shareholdings may not be necessarily healthy for a family firm in Taiwan.

PurposeThis study seeks to examine how agency problems and internal capital markets in group‐affiliated firms are mutually influenced by the ownership structure, capital structure, and performance. It also aims to examine the endogeneity in group affiliation.Design/methodology/approachUsing panel data, this study employs two‐stage least squares regression with the instrumental variable technique to examine the relationship among capital structure, ownership structure, and performance of group‐affiliated firms. Simultaneous equation models are constructed to identify the effects of interdependent decisions.FindingsThe empirical results indicate a U‐shaped relationship between insider ownership and performance. Moreover, the alignment of ownership and control rights determines the relationship between ownership structure and performance for group‐affiliated firms. The capital structure decisions of group‐affiliated firms are independent of firm performance and insider ownership, supporting the view that capital structure decisions of group‐affiliated firms are determined by the overall characteristics of the business group, rather than those of the individual firms.Practical implicationsBusiness groups can reduce the agency problems that occur in group affiliation by increasing the insider ownership (after a certain tunneling point), debt financing, and dividend payout.Originality/valuePrevious studies have paid little attention to the effects of the agency problem and the internal capital market on group affiliation. Whether endogeneity is a consequence of the common characteristics of group affiliation or a result of the simultaneity existing among ownership structure, capital structure, and performance is also unknown. This paper fills some of these gaps.

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