Jonathan GS Koppell is an assistant professor of politics, policy, and organization at the Yale School of Management. His recent book, The Politics of Quasi-Government (Cambridge University Press), considers the implications of delegating government functions to hybrid organizations such as government-sponsored enterprises and government corporations. His current work focuses on the development of transnational governance institutions, pseudogovernmental entities with authority and responsibility that span political boundaries. He holds a doctorate in political science from Berkeley.

This article presents evidence of name‐order effects in balloting from a study of the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City, in which the order of candidates’ names was rotated by precinct. In 71 of 79 individual nominating contests, candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed first than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71 contests the advantage to first position exceeded the winner's margin of victory, suggesting that ballot position would have determined the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all precincts.

This article explores the political influence of government‐sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government‐sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.

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China's reform of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) is intended to liberate the companies from bureaucratic control that hinders their management. Discussions of SOE reform, however, downplay the policy consequences. Can SOEs be “free” to succeed economically while some political control is maintained? Surprisingly, American experience with hybrid organizations—government‐created companies that straddle the line between public and private—offers some precedent for managing the balance between political control and enterprise independence. Three strategies are derived for China. First, welfare functions must be stripped from SOEs and replaced by policy objectives compatible with commercial purposes. Second, reducing financial dependence on SOEs will remove a barrier to rational control. Third, and most importantly, a robust regulatory framework for control must be developed as a substitute for the weakened administrative linkages. The emerging control infrastructure rooted in state asset commissions is likely to prove ineffective for its blurring of ownership, administration, and regulation.