The World Health Organization has declared the rapid spread of COVID-19 around the world a global public health emergency. It is well-known that the spread of the disease is influenced by people's willingness to adopt preventative public health behaviors, which are often associated with public risk perception. In this study, we present the first assessment of public risk perception of COVID-19 around the world using national samples (total N ¼ 6,991) in ten countries across Europe, America, and Asia. We find that although levels of concern are relatively high, they are highest in the UK compared to all other sampled countries. Pooled across countries, personal experience with the virus, individualistic and prosocial values, hearing about the virus from friends and family, trust in government, science, and medical professionals, personal knowledge of government strategy, and personal and collective efficacy were all significant predictors of risk perception. Although there was substantial variability across cultures, individualistic worldviews, personal experience, prosocial values, and social amplification through friends and family in particular were found to be significant determinants in more than half of the countries examined. Risk perception correlated significantly with reported adoption of preventative health behaviors in all ten countries. Implications for effective risk communication are discussed.

Misinformation about COVID-19 is a major threat to public health. Using five national samples from the UK ( n = 1050 and n = 1150), Ireland ( n = 700), the USA ( n = 700), Spain ( n = 700) and Mexico ( n = 700), we examine predictors of belief in the most common statements about the virus that contain misinformation. We also investigate the prevalence of belief in COVID-19 misinformation across different countries and the role of belief in such misinformation in predicting relevant health behaviours. We find that while public belief in misinformation about COVID-19 is not particularly common, a substantial proportion views this type of misinformation as highly reliable in each country surveyed. In addition, a small group of participants find common factual information about the virus highly unreliable. We also find that increased susceptibility to misinformation negatively affects people's self-reported compliance with public health guidance about COVID-19, as well as people's willingness to get vaccinated against the virus and to recommend the vaccine to vulnerable friends and family. Across all countries surveyed, we find that higher trust in scientists and having higher numeracy skills were associated with lower susceptibility to coronavirus-related misinformation. Taken together, these results demonstrate a clear link between susceptibility to misinformation and both vaccine hesitancy and a reduced likelihood to comply with health guidance measures, and suggest that interventions which aim to improve critical thinking and trust in science may be a promising avenue for future research.

In this study, we present results from five cross-sectional surveys on public risk perception of COVID-19 and its association with health protective behaviours in the UK over a 10-month period (March 2020 to January 2021). Samples were nationally balanced on age, gender, and ethnicity (total N ¼ 6,281). We find that although risk perception varies between the time points surveyed, it is consistently, significantly, and positively correlated with the reported adoption of protective health behaviours, such as wearing face masks or social distancing. There is also an increase in reported health protective behaviours in the UK between March 2020 and January 2021. The strength of the association between risk perception and behaviour varies by time point, with a stronger relationship in January 2021 compared to March and May 2020. We also assess the stability of the psychological determinants of risk perception over time. People's prosocial tendencies and individualistic worldviews, experience with the virus, trust in government, science, and medical professionals, as well as personal and collective efficacy all emerged as significant predictors. With few exceptions, these predictors remained consistent in their relationship with risk perception over time. Lastly, we find that psychological factors are more predictive of risk perception than an objective measure of situational severity, i.e. the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases at the time of data collection. Implications for risk communication are discussed.

Despite calls for political consensus, there is growing evidence that the public response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been politicized in the US. We examined the extent to which this polarization exists among the US public across two national studies. In a representative US sample ( N = 699, March 2020) we find that liberals (compared to conservatives) perceive higher risk, place less trust in politicians to handle the pandemic, are more trusting of medical experts such as the WHO, and are more critical of the government response. We replicate these results in a second, pre-registered study ( N = 1000; April 2020), and find that results are similar when considering partisanship, rather than political ideology. In both studies we also find evidence that political polarization extends beyond attitudes, with liberals consistently reporting engaging in a significantly greater number of health protective behaviors (e.g., wearing face masks) than conservatives. We discuss the possible drivers of polarization on COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors, and reiterate the need for fostering bipartisan consensus to effectively address and manage the COVID-19 pandemic.

ObjectiveDescribe demographical, social and psychological correlates of willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine.SettingSeries of online surveys undertaken between March and October 2020.ParticipantsA total of 25 separate national samples (matched to country population by age and sex) in 12 different countries were recruited through online panel providers (n=25 334).Primary outcome measuresReported willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccination.ResultsReported willingness to receive a vaccine varied widely across samples, ranging from 63% to 88%. Multivariate logistic regression analyses reveal sex (female OR=0.59, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.64), trust in medical and scientific experts (OR=1.28, 95% CI 1.22 to 1.34) and worry about the COVID-19 virus (OR=1.47, 95% CI 1.41 to 1.53) as the strongest correlates of stated vaccine acceptance considering pooled data and the most consistent correlates across countries. In a subset of UK samples, we show that these effects are robust after controlling for attitudes towards vaccination in general.ConclusionsOur results indicate that the burden of trust largely rests on the shoulders of the scientific and medical community, with implications for how future COVID-19 vaccination information should be communicated to maximise uptake.

Despite an overwhelming scientific consensus, a sizable minority of people doubt that human activity is causing climate change. Communicating the existence of a scientific consensus has been suggested as a way to correct individuals’ misperceptions about human-caused climate change and other scientific issues, though empirical support is mixed. We report an experiment in which psychology students were presented with consensus information about two issues, and subsequently reported their perception of the level of consensus and extent of their endorsement of those issues. We find that messages about scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change and the safety of genetically modified food shift perceptions of scientific consensus. Using mediation models we also show that, for both these issues, high consensus messages also increase reported personal agreement with the scientific consensus, mediated by changes in perceptions of a scientific consensus. This confirms the role of perceived consensus in informing personal beliefs about climate change, though results indicate the impact of single, one-off messages may be limited.

The success of mass COVID-19 vaccination campaigns rests on widespread uptake. However, although vaccinations provide good protection, they do not offer full immunity and while they likely reduce transmission of the virus to others, the extent of this remains uncertain. This produces a dilemma for communicators who wish to be transparent about benefits and harms and encourage continued caution in vaccinated individuals but not undermine confidence in an important public health measure. In two large pre-registered experimental studies on quota-sampled UK public participants we investigate the effects of providing transparent communication—including uncertainty—about vaccination effectiveness on decision-making. In Study 1 (n = 2097) we report that detailed information about COVID-19 vaccines, including results of clinical trials, does not have a significant impact on beliefs about the efficacy of such vaccines, concerns over side effects, or intentions to receive a vaccine. Study 2 (n = 2217) addressed concerns that highlighting the need to maintain protective behaviours (e.g., social distancing) post-vaccination may lower perceptions of vaccine efficacy and willingness to receive a vaccine. We do not find evidence of this: transparent messages did not significantly reduce perceptions of vaccine efficacy, and in some cases increased perceptions of efficacy. We again report no main effect of messages on intentions to receive a vaccine. The results of both studies suggest that transparently informing people of the limitations of vaccinations does not reduce intentions to be vaccinated but neither does it increase intentions to engage in protective behaviours post-vaccination.

Previous research has highlighted how ideological factors such as political self-identification, religiosity and conspiracy thinking influence our beliefs about scientific issues such as climate change and vaccination. Across three studies (combined N = 9,022) we expand on this line of inquiry to show for the first time that the ideological attitudes relating to authoritarianism and group-based dominance predict disagreement with the scientific consensus in several scientific domains. We show these effects are almost entirely mediated by varying combinations of ideological (political ideology, religiosity, free-market endorsement, conspiracy thinking) and science-specific (scientific knowledge, trust in scientists) constructs, depending on the scientific issue in question. Importantly, a general distrust of science and scientists emerges as the most consistent mediator across different scientific domains. We find that, consistent with previous research, the ideological roots of rejection of science vary across scientific issues. However, we also show that these roots may share a common origin in ideological attitudes regarding authority and equality.