No abstract

We examine the impact of firms’ board ties on bond yield spreads. Prior literature associates board connectedness with improved access to resources due to visibility and reputation arising from greater board capital. Consistent with the board capital hypothesis, we find that better connected firms are associated with greater media coverage and more ties to financial firms. Additionally, greater connectedness is linked with statistically and economically significant lower bond yield spreads, especially for firms with high information asymmetry. Our main result appears robust and includes significant negative (positive) changes in yield spreads to announcements of additions (departures) of highly connected directors.

This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the U.S. (Yankee) market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. We also find that the average stock price reaction to Yankee bond offerings is significantly positive and that abnormal returns are largest for first-time Yankee bond issuers. In addition, we show that foreign firms tend to issue in the Yankee market when the relative interest cost is low, indicating that potential differences in borrowing costs influence where firms choose to sell bonds.