Philosophers of education tend to mention Max Weber's social theory in passing, assuming its importance and presuming its comprehension, but few have paused to consider how Weber's social theory might consciously inform educational theory and research, and none have done so comprehensively. The aim of this article is to begin this inquiry through a pedagogical reading of Weber's social theory. The basis of my inquiry is Weber's claim in ‘Science as a Vocation’ that the moral purpose of scholarship is met when it provides persons with ‘self‐clarification’ and a ‘sense of responsibility’. Using this claim as guide, I make two arguments. First, I make the interpretive argument that Weber's descriptive social theory can be reconciled with his normative remarks about pedagogy. Second, I make the critical argument that Weber's conception of education not only withstands objections, but that it can also help us to discern blind‐spots obscured by the objectors' intellectual positions. Ultimately, I conclude that Weber's social theory should influence educational scholars, particularly, by serving as a sober guide for persons who would do well to interrogate the purposes of their work in a time and place where the practice of education is stuck between two undesirable purposes, increasing bureaucratisation and charismatic reform.
There is currently bipartisan support for criminal justice reform in the United States. One reform, recently passed through the Consolidated Appropriations Act/COVID relief package (December 2020), restored need-based, higher educational aid for incarcerated persons. With a resurgence of college-in-prison programs on the horizon, this article joins recent efforts to understand the moral justification of these programs not exclusively in terms of reductions in recidivism rates but in terms of a duty-based recognition of human dignity. It contributes to these efforts by examining the meaning and implications of recognizing human dignity behind bars, contending that the achievements of college-in-prison programs are morally justified insofar as they provide a model for recognizing the human dignity of all incarcerated persons (not just the select few they educate) and thereby spur the transformation of an institution that systematically ignores the role of human dignity in our moral lives.
In this essay John Fantuzzo critiques civic education's current focus on power and turns to James Baldwin's conception of love as offering an alternative approach. Fantuzzo's argument is that Baldwin's understanding of love can contribute to civic education by disclosing the significance of interpersonal solidarity between citizens, a significance that is obscured when power is of primary focus. He develops this argument by first examining the work of love in Baldwin's fiction and nonfiction. He then analyzes what he calls the familiar story in civic education, which is conceptually based in identity politics, progress, and power. Finding a sophisticated rehearsal of the familiar story in Meira Levinson's No Citizen Left Behind, Fantuzzo illuminates for readers how, despite the many strengths of her book, Levinson's focus on power obscures the need for interpersonal solidarity in civic education. He concludes by providing a close reading of Baldwin's “A Letter to My Nephew” in order to explain Baldwin's guiding principles for a civic education that prioritizes the work of love. Without ignoring social inequities or the need for civic empowerment, Fantuzzo shows that Baldwin contributes to civic education by prioritizing the work of love and instructing his nephew, and the reading public, to face the civic love gap.
Recalling the landmark US Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the advancement of educational equality is often associated with the reduction of stigmatizing differences in status or "sense of inferiority" engendered by separately and differentially educated citizens. This essay takes up the obverse concern, the sense of superiority sustained by educational inequality, with particular focus on the inequality signaled by higher education status (HES). I contend that the presence of aggrandized HES in a democratic society provides reasons to object to educational inequality for which institutions of higher education ought to be held responsible. Aggrandized HES not only demands a questionable deference from citizens in a democratic society; it also weakens HES's signaling of epistemic authority and equality of educational opportunity, which harms the public's motivation to learn by distorting beliefs about education. To address this problem, I argue that the best policy solution for curbing aggrandized uses of HES is to transform the positional aspect of higher education using an admissions policy originally suggested by Elizabeth Anderson, which I term the elite culture strategy. Beyond admissions policies, this essay addresses the larger concern of educating citizens to perceive and assess educational status according to democratic norms and not solely in terms of self-interested gain.
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