Are democracies more transparent than other types of political regimes? Many people believe that the presence of elections alone is not sufficient for a country to be considered democratic and that transparency must be included as part of the definition of political regime. We agree that contestability of elections and transparency of policymaking are analytically distinct concepts. Adopting minimalist approaches to democracy and transparency, we ask a basic question: do electoral politics provide incentives for governments to disseminate data? We thus investigate theoretically the relationship between regime type and the willingness of policy makers to provide credible announcements on policy-relevant variables. And we demonstrate empirically that the availability (or absence) of policy-relevant data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for GDP per capita, IMF participation, country fixed-effects, and time trends 1 . Democracies are indeed more transparent.1 Data and supporting materials to replicate the statistical results in this study can be found at https://files.nyu.edu/bpr1/public/ and http://journals.cambridge.org/JOP. 2 This is the view of the advocacy organization, Freedom House (see http://www.freedomhouse.org), and it is related to the work of Dahl (1971).

Some recent papers have concluded that authoritarian regimes have faster economic growth than democracies. These supposed growth benefits of autocracies are estimated using data sets in which growth rates rely heavily on data reported by each government. Governments have incentives to exaggerate their economic growth figures, however, and authoritarian regimes may have fewer limitations than democracies on their ability to do so. This paper argues that growth data submitted to international agencies are overstated by authoritarian regimes compared to democracies. If true, it calls into question the estimated relationship between government type and economic growth found in the literature. To measure the degree to which each government's official growth statistics are overstated, the economic growth rates reported in the World Bank's World Development Indicators are compared to a new measure of economic growth based on satellite imaging of nighttime lights. This comparison reveals whether or not dictators exaggerate their true growth rates and by how much. Annual GDP growth rates are estimated to be overstated by 0.5-1.5 percentage points in the statistics that dictatorships report to the World Bank.

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Why do foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows largely bypass the developing world? The objective of this article is to study this question by focusing on the effect of an increase in the level of democracy on FDI inflows into developing countries. An increase in the level of democracy provides the right macro and micro conditions for larger FDI inflows. The econometric results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the level of democracy is associated with increased FDI inflows. My empirical findings support a direct relationship between enhanced levels of democracy and FDI inflows, and the results call into question the idea that developing countries receive less capital inflows if they choose to democratize. Moreover, a reanalysis of Li and Resnick's influential 2003 paper essentially overturns their findings in support of a direct association between an increase in the level of democracy and greater FDI inflows.

This article studies the effect of political regime type on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy promotes growth because it conditions government consumption so that consumption is used for public purposes rather than private needs and this in turn leads to faster growth. By conditioning consumption towards public goods and away from private goods, we should see that consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more public goods like roads and education while in authoritarian regimes consumption yields less of these goods. Likewise, consumption should be associated with falling fertility in democratic regimes and rising fertility in authoritarian regimes. Using several measures of growth, the empirical estimates from a large- n fixed-effects regression show that democracy conditions consumption so that the latter is associated with faster growth. Moreover, the empirical analysis indicates that government consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more education completion and lower fertility rates.