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We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter.Keywords Know-how Á Concept possession Á Ability Á Propositional knowledge Á Understanding Á Intellectualism Recent philosophical discussion of the nature of know-how has focused on the relation between know-how and ability. This relation seems rather puzzling. On the one hand, many philosophers have noted that know-how attributions do not in

: Recent experimental research on the ' Knobe effect ' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this account while disconfi rming various currently prominent alternative accounts. We end by discussing some implications of this account for folk psychology.Awareness that an action is intentional plays an important role in evaluations of an actor and her action. This is only natural: if x intentionally acts to bring about a bad outcome, we may form different judgments about x or x ' s behavior than if that same outcome is simply an accident or the result of (non-willful) ignorance. In this way, whether or not a given action is intentional matters to us when we assess an action ' s or actor ' s evaluative status. This relation between judgments of intentionality 1 and judgments about the goodness/badness of actions or the responsibility (e.g. praiseworthiness/ blameworthiness) of actors seems to be a relatively straightforward part of folk psychology. What is surprising is that recent experimental research suggests that there is actually a bi -directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative (or normative) considerations. A series of studies suggest that not only do attributions of intentional Throughout, we use ' intentionality ' to denote a particular property of actions , namely, the property of being done intentionally. It is somewhat of an open question whether intentionality requires the specifi c mental state (or event) of intending, as defenders of the so-called ' simple view ' claim ( Adams, 1986;McCann, 1986McCann, , 2005. Since our primary focus is the explanation of attributions of intentionality, not intention, we shall set this issue to the side here.

It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called ''experimental philosophy'', we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concretecase judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one's considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism.