Recently, researchers found that the intended generalizability of (deep) face recognition systems increases their vulnerability against attacks. In particular, the attacks based on morphed face images pose a severe security risk to face recognition systems. In the last few years, the topic of (face) image morphing and automated morphing attack detection has sparked the interest of several research laboratories working in the field of biometrics and many different approaches have been published. In this paper, a conceptual categorization and metrics for an evaluation of such methods are presented, followed by a comprehensive survey of relevant publications. In addition, technical considerations and tradeoffs of the surveyed methods are discussed along with open issues and challenges in the field. INDEX TERMS Biometrics, face morphing attack, face recognition, image morphing, morphing attack detection.

The vulnerability of facial recognition systems to face morphing attacks is well known. Many different approaches for morphing attack detection (MAD) have been proposed in the scientific literature. However, the MAD algorithms proposed so far have mostly been trained and tested on datasets whose distributions of image characteristics are either very limited (e.g., only created with a single morphing tool) or rather unrealistic (e.g., no print-scan transformation). As a consequence, these methods easily overfit on certain image types and the results presented cannot be expected to apply to real-world scenarios. For example, the results of the latest NIST FRVT MORPH show that the majority of submitted MAD algorithms lacks robustness and performance when considering unseen and challenging datasets. In this work, subsets of the FERET and FRGCv2 face databases are used to create a realistic database for training and testing of MAD algorithms, containing a large number of ICAO-compliant bona fide facial images, corresponding unconstrained probe images, and morphed images created with four different face morphing tools. Furthermore, multiple post-processings are applied on the reference images, e.g., print-scan and JPEG2000 compression. On this database, previously proposed differential morphing algorithms are evaluated and compared. In addition, the application of deep face representations for differential MAD algorithms is investigated. It is shown that algorithms based on deep face representations can achieve very high detection performance (less than 3% D-EER) and robustness with respect to various post-processings. Finally, the limitations of the developed methods are analyzed.

This memo proposes several elliptic curve domain parameters over finite prime fields for use in cryptographic applications. The domain parameters are consistent with the relevant international standards, and can be used in X.509 certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs), for Internet

At Crypto'88, Matsumoto, Kato, and Imai presented two server-aided RSA protocols, RSA-S1 and RSA-S2, which speed up a client's RSA signature generation by i n teracting with a computationally strong but untrusted server. These protocols are quite attractive due to their e ciency, but unfortunately they are susceptible to multi-round active a ttacks. Therefore, on Eurocrypt'92, P tzmann and Waidner suggested to renew the decomposition of the secret key after each signature generation.In this paper we s h o w that in this case the non-binary version of RSA-S1 becomes totally insecure. Our experiments show that the secret key can be reconstructed very e ciently by lattice reduction using the data obtained by the server in the course of several executions of the protocol. On the other hand we s h o w that if the decomposition of the secret key is modi ed slightly, our attacks become ine cient. This modi cation does not a ect the e ciency of the protocol signi cantly.Furthermore, we present a v ery simple attack on the serveraided RSA protocol presented by Hong, Shin, Lee-Kwang and Yoon at ICISC'98. Using the parameters suggested by the authors, we can factor the modulus in only 2 37 steps.

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