In October 2017, most European countries reported unique atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru). The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of µBq·m−3 to more than 150 mBq·m−3. The widespread detection at such considerable (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To compare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods, concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The 106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment.

From early April 2020, wildfires raged in the highly contaminated areas around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (CNPP), Ukraine. For about 4 weeks, the fires spread around and into the Chernobyl exclusion zone (CEZ) and came within a few kilometers of both the CNPP and radioactive waste storage facilities. Wildfires occurred on several occasions throughout the month of April. They were extinguished, but weather conditions and the spread of fires by airborne embers and smoldering fires led to new fires starting at different locations of the CEZ. The forest fires were only completely under control at the beginning of May, thanks to the tireless and incessant work of the firefighters and a period of sustained precipitation. In total, 0.7−1.2 TBq 137 Cs were released into the atmosphere. Smoke plumes partly spread south and west and contributed to the detection of airborne 137 Cs over the Ukrainian territory and as far away as Western Europe. The increase in airborne 137 Cs ranged from several hundred μBq•m −3 in northern Ukraine to trace levels of a few μBq•m −3 or even within the usual background level in other European countries. Dispersion modeling determined the plume arrival time and was helpful in the assessment of the possible increase in airborne 137 Cs concentrations in Europe. Detections of airborne 90 Sr (emission estimate 345−612 GBq) and Pu (up to 75 GBq, mostly 241 Pu) were reported from the CEZ. Americium-241 represented only 1.4% of the total source term corresponding to the studied anthropogenic radionuclides but would have contributed up to 80% of the inhalation dose.

The aim of the study was to check for equivalence of computer codes that can perform calculations of true coincidence summing correction factors. All calculations were performed for a set of well-defined detector and sample parameters, without any reference to empirical data. For a p-type detector model the application of different codes resulted in satisfactory agreement in the calculated correction factors. For high-efficiency geometries in combination with an n-type detector and a radionuclide emitting abundant X-rays the results were scattered.

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