Over the past 12 years, as directed by federal and provincial regulations, Canadian pipeline companies have been formally developing and implementing Integrity Management Programs (IMPs). Since 1999, IMPs have been a requirement in the Canadian consensus industry standard CSA Z662. Furthermore, since the release of CSA Z662 Annex N in 2005, both the BC OGC and the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) (Canadian provincial regulators) have made CSA Z662 Annex N mandatory for their regulated companies. Annex N incorporates key management system (MS) elements such as a company’s policy and commitment, responsibilities, competency, planning, management of change, review and evaluation. This paper presents the findings of IMP audits conducted by the NEB and BC OGC regulators during the period of 2001–2011. This paper also includes the findings of NEB’s analysis of pipeline incidents that occurred between 2005 and 2009 and how these incident findings correlate to the audit findings. This paper is structured as follows: • Integrity management regulatory frameworks • IMP and MS elements and their interconnection • Audit findings from the NEB and the BC OGC • Incident findings from the NEB • Analysis of the audit findings and their correlation to incidents • Trends on IMP and MS audit and incident findings The paper provides a general understanding of the findings and their trends on pipeline integrity management and on incidents in terms of IMP/MS elements as described in Table 1. The results from this study may help stakeholders to determine strategies to increase the adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of pipeline integrity management. This paper does not include any company-specific information nor results and conclusions from any particular audit report or incident.
The National Energy Board’s (NEB or the Board) top priorities are the safety of people and protection of the environment. NEB-regulated pipelines have a very good safety record; however, the NEB noticed an increased trend in some types of incidents. Therefore, after considerable stakeholder consultation, in March 2012 the NEB started requiring NEB-regulated companies to report annually on new pipeline performance measures. These performance measures were developed and introduced to promote continual improvement in the management of pipelines by allowing companies to compare their results with industry aggregate numbers. In addition, these metric results allow the NEB to both evaluate and demonstrate that pipeline companies are effective in managing pipeline safety and protection of the environment. The NEB requires all regulated companies to report on incidents, such as releases of substances and serious injuries. Pipeline performance measures data provides the Board additional information such as lagging and leading indicators. These lagging indicators provide an historical view of company performance while the leading indicators provide forward looking data of potential future events. The NEB is of the view that an amalgamation of leading, lagging and qualitative measures can provide an overview of company effectiveness in meeting foundational management system program objectives. This paper examines four years of reported integrity related performance and integrity inspection data to evaluate trends in activities taken by companies to maintain safe pipelines. This paper will briefly discuss the challenges encountered when developing the measures, obtaining consistent data and evaluation of the data to identify trends. The paper will conclude by summarizing select results of the integrity performance measures and integrity inspection information data and discuss any potential future actions related to the pipeline performance integrity measures.
Heat treated pipeline fittings (principally elbows, tees, and reducers) require careful process control. For example, furnace temperature, placement of the fittings in the furnace, transfer time to quenching tank, adequacy of quench or tempering time can all impact the fittings’ mechanical properties if not done properly. In recent years, the National Energy Board (NEB) became aware of instances of quenched and tempered (Q&T) pipe and fittings having mechanical properties that did not meet Canadian Standards Association (CSA) or similar standards, being installed on pipeline systems under NEB and other regulatory bodies’ jurisdiction. In 2013, a pipeline rupture occurred on an NEB-regulated pipeline. Although failure to meet mechanical specifications was not the cause of the incident, the investigations revealed that there were fittings installed on the pipeline with yield strength of less than Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS). The NEB undertook further investigations to determine if this low yield issue might indicate a systemic problem. In the cases examined, contrary to the recorded information in the Material Test Reports (MTRs), not all fittings met the specified mechanical properties requirements, and this was due to inadequate controls in the Quality Assurance Programs (QAPs) of different stakeholders. It is also important to note that MTR results based on a coupon test may not always reflect the properties of each fitting produced following that process. The NEB has taken several actions in order to address this potential issue including: - Issuing industry-wide Safety Advisories - Issuing Orders to all companies under its jurisdiction - Commissioning a third party to investigate and write a technical paper on this issue - Hosting a technical workshop to facilitate broad dialogue between various stakeholders (using the technical paper as a seed document) In this paper, the authors first review the manufacturing process of Q&T fittings. Then case studies are discussed involving four instances of nonconforming fittings. Lastly the authors propose solutions for different stakeholders to effect improvement in Quality Assurance (QA) of pipeline fittings. The authors also recommended enhancement of applicable clauses in related standards and initiation of several research and development (R&D) projects.
As a result of numerous stress corrosion cracking incidents in the 1980s and early 1990 the National Energy Board (NEB) held an Inquiry1 in 1995 on the SCC failure mechanism and how to prevent failures. One of the recommendations of the Inquiry was Companies were to develop a SCC management program to proactively identify and mitigate SCC. Based on the apparent success of the SCC programs in significantly reducing SCC failures, the NEB revised its Onshore Pipeline Regulations in 1999 (OPR-99)2 to require companies to develop an integrity management program (IMP) for all hazards. This paper discusses the evolution of integrity management program (IMP) requirements and evaluates incident rates and other performance metrics to determine if there is evidence that IMPs have contributed to the improvement of safety of pipelines. The paper highlights the challenges associated with gathering incident and IMP performance metrics and evaluating the data to determine if there is a correlation between the implementation of IMP and pipeline safety. In addition, the analysis discusses the challenges associated with comparing data between different countries and regulatory jurisdictions. Suggestions for future improvement are identified.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.