No abstract

The impact of age on voting behaviour and political outcomes has become an issue of increasing interest, particularly in the UK. Age divides in voter turnout and political preferences have led to claims that age is the ‘new class’. In this article, we contrast existing ‘cultural backlash’ and political economy explanations of the age divide in politics, and challenge the view that older people are predominantly ‘left behind’, culturally or economically. We show that older people have distinct material interests, related to housing wealth and pensions’ income, that are visible in their political preferences. We argue for the development of a new political economy of age.

Recently, the idea of a universal basic income has received unprecedented attention from policymakers, the media and the wider public. This has inspired a plethora of surveys that seek to measure the extent of public support for the policy, many of which suggest basic income is surprisingly popular. However, in a review of past surveys, with a focus on the UK and Finland, we find that overall levels of support for basic income can vary considerably. We highlight the importance of survey design and, by employing new survey data in each country, compare the levels and determinants of support for varied models of basic income. Our results point to the importance of the multi-dimensionality of basic income and the fragility of public support for the idea. The findings suggest that the ability of political actors to mobilise the public in favour of basic income will eventually depend on the precise model they wish to implement.

No abstract

The intensification of behavioural requirements and punitive measures in unemployment benefits by UK governments has been popular and instrumental to the politics of welfare reform. Yet there is scant research into the politics of extending this approach to working households, known as ‘in-work conditionality’ (IWC), which was introduced in the UK under Universal Credit in 2012. Addressing this gap, we examine the preferences of political parties and voters towards IWC, using data from an online survey of 1,111 adults in 2017, party manifestos and parliamentary debates. While we find evidence of a partisan split between voters and politicians on the left (oppose IWC) and right (support IWC), intra-party divides and the relative infancy of IWC suggests the politics of IWC is not set in stone. This helps to explain the blame avoidance strategies of current and previous Conservative governments responsible for IWC.