Social comparison theory has evolved considerably since Festinger (1954) originally proposed it. This article integrates these changes with insights offered by recent social comparison studies and by research on social cognition and the self. Contrary to the original theory or subsequent research, (a) the individual is not always an unbiased self-evaluator but may seek many goals through social comparison; (b) the social environment may not be inactive but may impose unwanted comparisons; and (c) the comparison process involves more than selecting a comparison target: It is bidirectional, rather than unidirectional, and it may adopt a variety of forms to meet the individual's goals. Research involving comparisons of personal attributes illustrates these principles.The author is grateful to several people who provided very helpful critiques of previous drafts of this article:

Attributions for cancer and beliefs about control over cancer were examined for their association with adjustment to breast cancer. Although 95% of the respondents made attributions for their cancer, no particular attribution (e.g., stress, diet) was associated with better adjustment. Analyses of attributions of responsibility for the cancer to the self, environment, another person, or chance yielded only a negative relation between adjustment and blaming another person. In contrast, both the belief that one could now control one's cancer and the belief that others (e.g. the physician) could now control the cancer were significantly associated with good adjustment. Of the different types of control, cognitive control was most strongly associated with adjustment, behavior control was less strongly associated with adjustment, and information control and retrospective control were unassociated with adjustment. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

Despite renewed vigor in the social comparison literature, little attention has been paid to methods of studying social comparison. This article examines frequently used measures and procedures in social comparison research. The question of whether a method truly captures social comparison requires a clear understanding of what social comparison is; hence a definition of social comparison is proposed, multiple ancillary processes in social comparison are identified, and definitional controversies are addressed. Then, methods are examined for how strongly they imply social comparison and for whether they capture social comparisons as they would occur naturally. It is argued that some methods may not truly capture social comparison, that some methods may be too vulnerable to alternative interpretations to be useful, and that some methods may paint an inaccurate picture of social comparison.

We investigated four theoretical perspectives concerning the role of social comparison (Festinger, 1954) in coping with a threatening event in a sample of breast cancer patients. According to the supercoper perspective, personal contact with comparison others is often unavailable to patients, and contact with media "supercopers"--fellow victims presented as adjusting very smoothly--may make patients feel inadequate by comparison. According to the similarity perspective, patients select comparison targets who are similar to themselves because those comparisons should be the most informative. The upward comparison perspective is predictive of comparisons to relatively advantaged or superior individuals. The downward comparison perspective leads to the prediction that under conditions of threat, individuals make comparisons to people who are inferior or less fortunate in order to enhance their self-esteem. We interviewed 78 breast cancer patients, and results of both closed-ended questions and spontaneously offered comparisons yielded a preponderance of downward comparisons. The results point to the value of using naturalistic methods for studying comparisons, and suggest a more active and cognitive role for social comparison than is usually portrayed.

A theory of victims' responses to their victimization, termed Selective Evaluation, is proposed. It is maintained that the perception that one is a victim and the belief that others perceive one as a victim are aversive. Victims react to this aversive state by selectively evaluating themselves and their situation in ways that are self‐enhancing. Five mechanisms of selective evaluation that minimize victimization are proposed and discussed: making social comparisons with less fortunate others (i.e., downward comparison); selectively focusing on attributes that make one appear advantaged; creating hypothetical, worse worlds; construing benefit from the victimizing event; and manufacturing normative standards of adjustment that make one's own adjustment appear exceptional. The theory is integrated with the existing literature on victimization, and possible functions of selective evaluation are discussed.

Five studies examined the hypotheses that when people experience positive affect, those low in self-esteem are especially likely to dampen that affect, whereas those high in self-esteem are especially likely to savor it. Undergraduate participants' memories for a positive event (Study 1) and their reported reactions to a success (Study 2) supported the dampening prediction. Results also suggest that dampening was associated with worse mood the day after a success (Study 2), that positive and negative affect regulation are distinct, that self-esteem is associated with affect regulation even when Neuroticism and Extraversion are controlled (Studies 3 and 4), and that self-esteem may be especially important for certain types of positive events and positive affect regulation (Study 5).

People with high self-esteem (HSEs) respond less negatively to failure than people with low self-esteem (LSEs). This difference may occur because HSEs overcome the natural tendency to focus on negative thoughts after failure, and instead focus on their strengths. In 2 experiments, participants with high and low self-esteem received failure, success, or no feedback. Accessibility of strengths and weaknesses was measured by response latency on an unrelated task. Results confirmed that although strengths were typically more accessible than weaknesses for both groups, the discrepancy was larger for HSEs after failure feedback than after no feedback. This heightened discrepancy appears to result from HSEs recruiting their strengths and suppressing their weaknesses. In contrast, LSEs' weaknesses appeared to become especially accessible after failure. These results have implications for the mood-congruent cognition and self-esteem literatures.

Despite growing evidence that depression is linked with self-focused attention, little is known about how depressed individuals become self-focused or, more generally, about what arouses self-focus in everyday life. Two experiments examined the hypothesis that affect itself induces self-focused attention. In Experiment 1, moods were manipulated with an imagination mood-induction procedure. Sad-induction Ss became higher in self-focus than did neutral-induction Ss. Experiment 2 replicated this effect for sad moods by means of a musical mood-induction procedure and different measures of self-focus. However, Experiment 2 failed to support the hypothesis that happy moods induce self-focus. The results have implications for mood-induction research, self-focused attention, and recent models of depression.