BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREATBWTAIN (b) There are indications that Hegel meant his procedure to be less hit-and-miss than Forster implies, e.g. the claim, in the accounts of Being and Nothing, that each becomes the other, so that Becoming is somehow already involved in Being and Nothing, before it appears as the category that unifies and preserves them. (c) Some categories, e.g. Becoming itself, do not have any obvious contrary, so it is hard to see how Forster's account applies to them. (d) It is unlikely that any single formula (such as Hegel's reference to "the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative", cited by Forster on p. 178) captures all the procedures involved in Hegel's Logic. In particular in a work as reflective as the Logic we would expect the method of procedure to be considered and reconstructed as the work advances, just as the categories are, so that it does not remain the same throughout the work. The Logic is thus probably more diverse, and perhaps less coherent, than Forster supposes. To conclude: these criticisms do not affect my judgement of the excellence of Forster's book. It is indispensable to anyone interested in Hegel or Greek scepticism or epistemology in general, and it will, in my view, be recognised in years to come as an important landmark in Anglo-Saxon Hegel studies.
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