Reviewing the literature on political participation and civic engagement, the article offers a critical examination of different conceptual frameworks. Drawing on previous definitions and operationalisations, a new typology for political participation and civic engagement is developed, highlighting the multidimensionality of both concepts. In particular, it makes a clear distinction between manifest "political participation" (including formal political behaviour as well as protest or extra-parliamentary political action) and less direct or "latent" forms of participation, conceptualized here as "civic engagement" and "social involvement". The article argues that the notion of "latent" forms of participation is crucial to understand new forms of political behaviour and the prospects for political participation in different countries. Due to these innovations it contributes to a much-needed theoretical development within the literature on political participation and citizen engagement.

This article offers a critical investigation of one indicator of support for democracy frequently used by comparativists. Departing from a theoretical multidimensional model of political support, and drawing on large-scale public opinion surveys, we argue that the survey item 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice. At the same time, we show that this item is far from a perfect indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime, since it is highly sensitive to different institutional contexts. By demonstrating empirically some of the problems involved when trying to asses the levels of support for democracy in postcommunist Europe, we argue for a more cautious approach when analysing problems of legitimacy in processes of democratic consolidation. We also advocate the need for multiple indicators when analysing political support.

The current debate on political participation is bound to a discussion about whether citizens are active or passive. This dichotomous notion is nurtured by an extensive normative debate concerning whether passivity is an asset or a threat to democracy; and it is especially manifest in studies of young people's political orientations. Drawing on this discussion, the present study goes beyond the dichotomy by keeping political interest conceptually separate from participation in order to improve our understanding of political passivity. Multivariate cluster analysis of empirical data on Swedish youth suggests that we need to consider three distinctive forms of 'political passivity'. In the paper we present empirical evidence not only of the existence of a particular 'standby citizen', but also of two kinds of genuinely passive young people: unengaged and disillusioned citizens. Alongside active citizens, these people are in distinctly different categories with regard to their political behavior. This entails a new analytical framework that may be used to analyze an empirical phenomenon that has received surprisingly little attention in the literature on political participation and civic engagement.

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In past decades a number of countries that have moved away from outright authoritarianism have not transformed into democracies, but rather into regimes that combine democratic and non-democratic characteristics, sometimes labeled hybrid regimes. This article develops a framework for analyzing hybrid regimes. Empirically, the article examines three cases, Tanzania, Russia, and Venezuela, looking specifically at electoral participation and support for the opposition, as well as the potential for political change, i.e. public discontent and conditions for mobilization. The article demonstrates that the stability of hybrid regimes is related to the incumbents' ability to circumvent the opposition, but also to the lack of interplay between citizens and opposition parties.

Comparing eight post-communist semi-presidential systems (Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia), comprising a total of 65 instances of intraexecutive coexistence between 1991 and 2007, this article asks to what extent and in what ways president-cabinet conflicts increase the risk of cabinet instability. Previous studies of intra-executive conflicts in semi-presidential regimes have mainly been occupied with explaining why conflicts occur in the first place, and neglected the question of how such conflicts are actually related to political outcomes. The present empirical investigation demonstrates that the occurrence of intra-executive conflict in transitional semi-presidential systems is likely to produce high rates of cabinet turnover. 2The constitutional framework in transitional countries is a terrain on which political incumbents struggle to expand and define their influence. Under semi-presidentialism -with two separately chosen chief executives -this struggle is particularly manifested in conflicts between presidents and prime ministers. This sample represents a deliberate attempt to cover transitional countries with different forms of semi-presidential regimes (premier-presidential and president-parliamentary). Also, in the period under review, all these countries have experienced an uncertain transitional phase, making them especially appropriate for the kind of analysis we have in mind. In transitional countries, effects conventionally associated with cabinet instability -disruptive policy making, political unpredictability and lack of political accountability -are generally considered undesirable, as potential threats to the fragile democratization process.The article is thus related to the rich body of literature on institutional design and democracy performance. The article also utilizes a number of indicators of constitutional practices (1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007) to assess the conflict level in the eight countries under review.Stepan, and C.

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The role of 'fair' institutions in developing democratic legitimacy has received increased attention. Citizens who perceive -on basis of past experiences -that they are being treated fairly by authorities have been held to have greater trust in political institutions. However, previous studies on the relationship between procedural fairness and political trust have not paid sufficient attention to individuals with limited first-hand experiences of authorities. We examine the relationship on an authority that virtually all individuals meet early in life: the school. Using structural equation modeling on unique panel data covering 1500 Swedish adolescents (ages ranging from 13 to 17), we find a reciprocal relationship: personal encounters with school authorities shape young people's political trust; however, the images that adolescents get of the political system (through family, peers, media and so on) have also consequences on their perceptions about the authorities they encounter in their daily lives. The analysis increases our understanding of how individuals form their political allegiances by showing that the relationship between fairness and trust is more dynamic than has previously been suggested: neither an accumulated set of experiences of authorities nor formal ties with political institutions (as voters and so on) are required for a relationship to emerge.