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Understanding animal movement is essential to elucidate how animals interact, survive, and thrive in a changing world. Recent technological advances in data collection and management have transformed our understanding of animal “movement ecology” (the integrated study of organismal movement), creating a big-data discipline that benefits from rapid, cost-effective generation of large amounts of data on movements of animals in the wild. These high-throughput wildlife tracking systems now allow more thorough investigation of variation among individuals and species across space and time, the nature of biological interactions, and behavioral responses to the environment. Movement ecology is rapidly expanding scientific frontiers through large interdisciplinary and collaborative frameworks, providing improved opportunities for conservation and insights into the movements of wild animals, and their causes and consequences.

Individuals vary in their cognitive performance. While this variation forms the foundation of the study of human psychometrics, its broader importance is only recently being recognized. Explicitly acknowledging this individual variation found in both humans and non-human animals provides a novel opportunity to understand the mechanisms, development and evolution of cognition. The papers in this special issue highlight the growing emphasis on individual cognitive differences from fields as diverse as neurobiology, experimental psychology and evolutionary biology. Here, we synthesize this body of work. We consider the distinct challenges in quantifying individual differences in cognition and provide concrete methodological recommendations. In particular, future studies would benefit from using multiple task variants to ensure they target specific, clearly defined cognitive traits and from conducting repeated testing to assess individual consistency. We then consider how neural, genetic, developmental and behavioural factors may generate individual differences in cognition. Finally, we discuss the potential fitness consequences of individual cognitive variation and place these into an evolutionary framework with testable hypotheses. We intend for this special issue to stimulate researchers to position individual variation at the centre of the cognitive sciences.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

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Transparent Cylinder and Barrier tasks are used to purportedly assess inhibitory control in a variety of animals. However, we suspect that performances on these detour tasks are influenced by non-cognitive traits, which may result in inaccurate assays of inhibitory control. We therefore reared pheasants under standardized conditions and presented each bird with two sets of similar tasks commonly used to measure inhibitory control. We recorded the number of times subjects incorrectly attempted to access a reward through transparent barriers, and their latencies to solve each task. Such measures are commonly used to infer the differential expression of inhibitory control. We found little evidence that their performances were consistent across the two different Putative Inhibitory Control Tasks (PICTs). Improvements in performance across trials showed that pheasants learned the affordances of each specific task. Critically, prior experience of transparent tasks, either Barrier or Cylinder, also improved subsequent inhibitory control performance on a novel task, suggesting that they also learned the general properties of transparent obstacles. Individual measures of persistence, assayed in a third task, were positively related to their frequency of incorrect attempts to solve the transparent inhibitory control tasks. Neophobia, Sex and Body Condition had no influence on individual performance. Contrary to previous studies of primates, pheasants with poor performance on PICTs had a wider dietary breadth assayed using a free-choice task. Our results demonstrate that in systems or taxa where prior experience and differences in development cannot be accounted for, individual differences in performance on commonly used detour-dependent PICTS may reveal more about an individual's prior experience of transparent objects, or their motivation to acquire food, than providing a reliable measure of their inhibitory control.

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Rates of innovative foraging behaviours and success on problem-solving tasks are often used to assay differences in cognition, both within and across species. Yet the cognitive features of some problem-solving tasks can be unclear. As such, explanations that attribute cognitive mechanisms to individual variation in problem-solving performance have revealed conflicting results. We investigated individual consistency in problem-solving performances in captive-reared pheasant chicks, Phasianus colchicus, and addressed whether success depends on cognitive processes, such as trial-and-error associative learning, or whether performances may be driven solely via noncognitive motivational mechanisms, revealed through subjects' willingness to approach, engage with and persist in their interactions with an apparatus, or via physiological traits such as body condition. While subjects' participation and success were consistent within the same problems and across similar tasks, their performances were inconsistent across different types of task. Moreover, subjects' latencies to approach each test apparatus and their attempts to access the reward were not repeatable across trials. Successful individuals did not improve their performances with experience, nor were they consistent in their techniques in repeated presentations of a task. However, individuals that were highly motivated to enter the experimental chamber were more likely to participate. Successful individuals were also faster to approach each test apparatus and more persistent in their attempts to solve the tasks than unsuccessful individuals. Our findings therefore suggest that individual differences in problem-solving success can arise from inherent motivational differences alone and hence be achieved without inferring more complex cognitive processes.