With the growing development of Internet technology and popularization of mobile devices, we easily access the Internet anytime and anywhere by mobile devices. It has brought great convenience for our lives. But it brought more challenges than traditional wired communication, such as confidentiality and privacy. In order to improve security and privacy protection in using mobile network, numerous multi-receiver identity-based encryption schemes have been proposed with bilinear pairing and probabilistic hap-to-point (HTP) function. To address the troubles of private key escrow in multi-receiver encryption scheme based on ID-PKC, recently, some certificateless anonymous multi-receiver encryption (CLAMRE) schemes are introduced. But previous CLAMRE schemes using the bilinear pairing are not suitable to mobile device because the use of bilinear pairing and probabilistic hashto-point (HTP) function results in expensive operation costs in encryption or decryption. In this paper, we propose an efficient CLAMRE scheme using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) without bilinear pairing and HTP hash function. Since our scheme does not use bilinear pairing and HTP operation during the encryption and decryption process, the proposed CLAMRE scheme has much less computation cost than the latest CLAMRE schemes. Performance analysis shows that runtime of our scheme is much less when the sender generates ciphertext, compared with existing schemes. Security analysis shows proposed CLAMRE scheme provides confidentiality of message and receiver anonymity under the random oracle model with the difficulties of decision DiffieHellman problem and against the adversaries defined in CL-PKC system.

Wireless sensor networks are deployed to monitor the surrounding physical environments and they also act as the physical environments of parasitic sensor networks, whose purpose is analyzing the contextual privacy and obtaining valuable information from the original wireless sensor networks. Recently, contextual privacy issues associated with wireless communication in open spaces have not been thoroughly addressed and one of the most important challenges is protecting the source locations of the valuable packages. In this paper, we design an all-direction random routing algorithm (ARR) for source-location protecting against parasitic sensor networks. For each package, the routing process of ARR is divided into three stages, i.e., selecting a proper agent node, delivering the package to the agent node from the source node, and sending it to the final destination from the agent node. In ARR, the agent nodes are randomly chosen in all directions by the source nodes using only local decisions, rather than knowing the whole topology of the networks. ARR can control the distributions of the routing paths in a very flexible way and it can guarantee that the routing paths with the same source and destination are totally different from each other. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for the parasitic sensor nodes to trace the packages back to the source nodes. Simulation results illustrate that ARR perfectly confuses the parasitic nodes and obviously outperforms traditional routing-based schemes in protecting source-location privacy, with a marginal increase in the communication overhead and energy consumption. In addition, ARR also requires much less energy than the cloud-based source-location privacy protection schemes.

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