We develop a theory that shows signaling a firm’s fundamental quality (e.g., its operational capabilities) to lenders through inventory transactions to be more efficient—it leads to less costly operational distortions—than signaling through loan requests, and we characterize how the efficiency gains depend on firm operational characteristics, such as operating costs, market size, and inventory salvage value. Signaling through inventory being only tenable when inventory transactions are verifiable at low enough cost, we then turn our attention to how this verifiability can be achieved in practice and argue that blockchain technology could enable it more efficiently than traditional monitoring mechanisms. To demonstrate, we develop b_verify, an open-source blockchain protocol that leverages Bitcoin to provide supply chain transparency at scale and in a cost-effective way. The paper identifies an important benefit of blockchain adoption—by opening a window of transparency into a firm’s supply chain, blockchain technology furnishes the ability to secure favorable financing terms at lower signaling costs. Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred signaling mode sheds light on what types of firms or supply chains would stand to benefit the most from this use of blockchain technology. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.

This article studies two types of flexibility used by firms to better respond to uncertain market conditions: resource flexibility and responsive pricing. We consider a situation in which a single flexible resource can be used to satisfy two distinct demand classes. While the resource capacity must be decided based on uncertain demand functions, the resource allocation as well as the pricing decision are made based on the realized demand functions. We characterize the effects of two key drivers of flexibility: demand variability and demand correlation, assuming normally distributed demand curve intercepts. Demand variability creates opportunity costs and, with fixed prices, decreases the firm’s profit. We show that with the additional flexibility gained from responsive pricing, the firm can maximize the benefits of favorable demand conditions and mitigate the effects of poor demand conditions, ultimately profiting from variability. Positive demand correlation, on the other hand, remains undesirable under responsive pricing. The optimal capacity of the flexible resource is always increasing in both demand variability and demand correlation. This contrasts with the scenarios based on fixed prices, highlighting the crucial difference that responsive pricing makes in the management of flexible resources. We further quantify the value of flexibility for the firm and its customers by considering, as a benchmark, a firm relying on two dedicated resources. The value of flexibility is most significant if the demand levels are highly variable and negatively correlated. In such cases, the firm benefits from demand variability due to responsive pricing, while facing limited demand risk due to resource flexibility. Finally, we endogenize the input price of the flexible resource by considering the pricing decision of the resource supplier.

W e consider a firm that invests in capacity under demand uncertainty and thus faces two related but distinct types of risk: mismatch between capacity and demand and profit variability. Whereas mismatch risk can be mitigated with greater operational flexibility, profit variability can be reduced through financial hedging. We show that the relationship between these two risk mitigating strategies depends on the type of flexibility: Product flexibility and financial hedging tend to be complements (substitutes)-i.e., product flexibility tends to increase (decrease) the value of financial hedging, and, vice versa, financial hedging tends to increase (decrease) the value of product flexibility-when product demands are positively (negatively) correlated. In contrast to product flexibility, postponement flexibility is a substitute to financial hedging as intuitively expected. Although our analytical results assume perfect flexibility and perfect hedging and rely on a linear approximation of the value of hedging, we validate their robustness in an extensive numerical study.

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer's purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model's predictions and are statistically and economically significant.

T his paper has two objectives. First, we show how debt financing distorts a retailer's inventory decision when the retailer orders multiple items that differ in cost, revenue, or demand parameters. Taking advantage of limited liability, a debt-financed retailer favors items with a low salvage value, those with a high profit margin, and those that represent a large proportion of the total inventory investment. Second, we argue that this distortion is mitigated when the financing is provided by the supplier who can observe the actual order quantities before determining the credit terms. Borrowing goods rather than borrowing cash limits the retailer's ability to deviate from the first-best inventory decision. On the flip side, few suppliers can access capital at the same low cost as banks. We study a combination of bank and supplier financing that allows the retailer to get the best of both worlds.