Traditionally, objects of attention are characterized either as full-fledged entities or either as elements grouped by Gestalt principles. Because humans appear to use social groups as units to explain social activities, we proposed that a socially defined group, according to social interaction information, would also be a possible object of attentional selection. This hypothesis was examined using displays with and without handshaking interactions. Results demonstrated that object-based attention, which was measured by an object-specific attentional advantage (i.e., shorter response times to targets on a single object), was extended to two hands performing a handshake but not to hands that did not perform meaningful social interactions, even when they did perform handshake-like actions. This finding cannot be attributed to the familiarity of the frequent co-occurrence of two handshaking hands. Hence, object-based attention can select a grouped object whose parts are connected within a meaningful social interaction. This finding implies that object-based attention is constrained by top-down information.

Actions are usually generalized among social group members. Importantly, the efficiency of an action with respect to achieving an external target determines action understanding, and it may have different degrees of social relevance to social groups. Thus, this study explored the role of action efficiency in action generalization. We used computer animations to simulate actions in social groups initiated by visual action cues or category labels, and we measured differences in response times between identifying actions that were and were not consistent with group members, without explicit requirements regarding generalization. It was found that in both visually introduced and explicitly labeled social groups, when the group members acted inefficiently toward the external object, perceivers identified group‐consistent actions faster than group‐inconsistent actions, indicating that the exemplars' common inefficient actions are generalized to the unknown ingroup member, accordingly facilitating the identification of expected consistent inefficient action (Experiment 1). As this effect was not present when removing social group cues, it was determined to be specific to social groups (Experiment 2). Importantly, such generalization was not observed when the identical action was deemed efficient toward the external object (Experiment 3) and was specific to the demonstration of the action being completed by multiple group members rather than being repeated twice by one group member, supporting the group‐based inference and ruling out the possibility of the increased memorability of inefficient actions leading to more generalization relative to efficient actions (Experiment 4). Therefore, the efficiency of an action bounds the generalization of the action across social group members through a process that is spontaneous and implicit. This constrained action generalization may be due to inefficient actions being represented as culture‐specific conventional forms.

The current study investigated whether the deep properties or shallow features of behaviors are implicitly expected to be consistent across members of highly entitative groups, by exploiting the notion that goals-as deep properties-and movements-as shallow features-can be dissociated in object-directed behaviors. Participants were asked to view group members' goal-directed behaviors toward an object. Whether perceivers implicitly expected that a new member would perform the same movement to the previously visited location (i.e., exhibit shallow feature-based behavior) or a new movement to the previously visited object (i.e., exhibit deep property-based behavior) was recorded. Study 1 revealed that perceivers implicitly expected members of a highly entitative group to approach the previously visited object with a new movement (i.e., to have a consistent goal) rather than perform the same movement to the previously visited location (i.e., to express a consistent movement). Study 2 confirmed that the responses in Study 1 were explained by group members conforming to, rather than violating, internal expectations (i.e., of consistent movement). Importantly, the implicit expectation of shared behaviors across group members relies on the goal interpretation of actions instead of the associations between actions and outcomes (Study 3). Study 4 replicated the facilitation effect of Study 1 and revealed that the goal-based expectation of common behaviors among group members is based on the majority behavior instead of a single demonstration. Hence, individuals in highly entitative groups are implicitly expected to behave consistently based on the deep properties of behaviors instead of their shallow features.

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