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Green innovation is vital for manufacturing enterprises to achieve a balance between economic, environmental and social benefits. This paper empirically investigates the mechanisms of government subsidies, R&D investment and public participatory environmental regulation on green innovation in manufacturing enterprises, selecting a sample of 1308 manufacturing firms listed on Chinese A-shares from 2010–2019. The results show that government subsidies can significantly promote green innovation in manufacturing enterprises, with private enterprises being more pronounced. R&D investment plays a mediating role in green innovation in manufacturing enterprises, while public participatory environmental regulation has a negative impact. The moderating effect of public participatory environmental regulation on government subsidies is different on different green patents, with a more negative effect on green invention patents than on green utility model patents. Public participatory environmental regulation has a negative moderating effect on the green innovation of state-owned manufacturing enterprises while having no significant effect on private manufacturing enterprises.

Green innovation is vital in transforming China’s economic development from high speed to high quality. Environmental regulation plays an important role in stimulating regional green innovation, and appropriate environmental decentralization is the institutional basis to consolidate the innovation compensation of environmental regulation. Clarifying the relationship among environmental regulation, environmental decentralization, and green innovation is of great theoretical and practical significance for regional environmental management and green innovation development. This paper incorporates environmental regulation, environmental decentralization, and regional green innovation into the same analytical framework and constructs a fixed-effects model and a threshold panel model to empirically examine the intrinsic relationship between them based on panel data of 30 Chinese provinces from 2006 to 2015. The estimation results indicate that environmental regulation has a positive impact on regional green innovation, which is greater in developed regions than in underdeveloped regions. Environmental decentralization plays a negative role in regional green innovation, with underdeveloped regions being affected to a greater extent. The impact of environmental regulation on regional green innovation shows a threshold characteristic with the change of the degree of environmental decentralization, while the green innovation utility of environmental regulation gradually decreases with the increase of the degree of environmental decentralization.

The adoption of sustainable manure treatment technologies (SMTTs) in livestock production helps to reduce agricultural contamination. As such, understanding what determines farmers’ adoption of SMTTs is an essential prerequisite for the administrative handling of livestock pollution. Applying a multivariate probit model on a cross-sectional data set of 686 pig farmers in Poyang Lake Region in China, this study discovered that two key factors influencing farmers’ decisions to adopt multiple SMTTs are off-farm labor and environmental awareness. In other words, households with a higher share of off-farm labor are less likely to adopt SMTTs. Farmers with higher environmental awareness are more likely to adopt SMTTs. The results also revealed that because of the inappropriateness of government subsidy and insufficient technical training, the impact of Chinese government subsidy on the adoption of biogas technology is negligible, but the subsidy on composting greatly helps to promote the adoption of composting technology. We also found a substitution effect and complementary effects between different SMTTs. These findings can improve policymakers’ understanding of farmers’ joint adoption decisions. It also helps policymakers to optimize subsidy strategies to encourage farmers’ adoption of SMTTs in rural China.

The COVID-19 pandemic has plunged the housing affordability and living sanitary conditions of China's low-income groups into a crisis. Public rental housing has made a significant contribution to alleviating this crisis, yet its exit problem has become more acute due to the impact of the epidemic. In order to explore how to effectively play the role of multi-governance in public rental housing exit, this paper adopts game theory to analyze the evolution of the behavioral strategies of government departments and public rental housing tenants in public rental housing exit by combining four influencing parameters: the epidemic severity, the epidemic influence coefficient, the public participation degree, and the public reporting fairness. In response to exploring the conditions for the effective functioning of the multi-governance model under the impact of the epidemic, the influences of parameter change on the stability of the system are analyzed. The results show that when the COVID-19 epidemic impact coefficient is high, government departments need to reduce their own supervision costs to achieve better multi-governance effects; when public reports are distorted, the government departments’ own supervision capabilities determine the impact of public participation on governance effects.

Effective prevention and control of agricultural non-point source pollution is a major challenge faced by the Chinese local government in the context of rural revitalization, and clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders in agricultural non-point source pollution control actions will help achieve multiple co-governance better. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between local government and livestock and poultry breeding enterprise (LPBE) under the participation of Environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) and public, by constructing an evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that government subsidy has an incentive effect on LPBE to adopt the purifying strategy, yet reduces the enthusiasm of local government for supervision. Improving the participation degree and right space of ENGOs is conducive to the realization of multiple co-governance models. Furthermore, the impact of public participation on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution is related to the local government’s investigation rate and the public reporting fairness; strengthening the local government’s supervision capacity and improving the public reporting fairness can achieve better collaborative governance effects.