Both new materialist philosophy of science and Indigenous studies scholarship have developed theories about the agency of non-human things. There has, however, been relatively little articulation between these two literatures in the qualitative social sciences. This essay looks at the possible reasons for this lack of engagement–including the relatively recent emergence of new materialism, pervasive racism within the academy, and foundational differences in the priorities and philosophical assumptions informing these two literatures. Addressing new materialist scholars, the essay inventories the ethical, political, and intellectual reasons social scientists using Karen Barad’s concept of agential realism should also be reading and citing Indigenous studies literature on agent ontologies. It makes the case that the Indigenous studies literature on agent ontologies have strengths in precisely some of the places new materialist social science is facing challenges. Examples are provided and the broader political implications of such work are examined.

Agential realism—the idea that it makes sense to view the world as being composed of various forms of protean nonhuman agency—has been a topic of discussion for many social science scholars in recent years. This increase of interest in agent ontologies can be attributed to the new feminist materialist movement in the philosophy of science literature. However, agent ontologies also are found in Indigenous studies literature and in Peircean pragmatism. These latter sources are also a part of the current methodological conversation about nonhuman agency. This article explores the connections between agential realist philosophy and social science research that employs narrative forms of analysis and representation. The goal is to assist narrative researchers in avoiding oversimplification by tracing out different strands in these literatures and mapping out points of connection and disconnection in detail. Intersections that hold the promise of complementary development are highlighted.

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