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Katz and Sala linked the development of committee property rights in the late-nineteenth-century U.S. House of Representatives to the introduction of the Australian ballot. If, as they posited, members sought personal reputations to carry them to reelection in the new electoral environment, the current article argues that behaviors with more immediate political payoffs also should have changed in ways their theory would predict. The article examines whether committee assignments, floor voting behavior, and the distribution of pork barrel projects changed in predicted ways and finds supportive outcomes, but usually only when the office bloc ballot, and not the party bloc ballot, was in use.

Novel methods to increase crop productivity are required to meet anticipated demands for food, feed, fiber, and fuel. It is becoming feasible to use modern sensors and data analysis techniques for predicting plant growth and productivity based on genomic, phenotypic, and environmental data. To design and construct crops that deliver desired traits requires trained personnel with scientific and engineering expertise as well as a variety of "soft" skills. To address these needs at Iowa State University, we developed a graduate specialization called "Predictive Plant Phenomics" (P3). Although some of our experiences may be unique, many of the specialization's principles are likely to be broadly applicable to others interested in developing graduate training programs in plant phenomics. P3 involves transdisciplinary training and activities designed to develop communication, teambuilding, and management skills. To support students in this demanding and unique intellectual environment, we established a two-week boot camp before their first semester and founded a community of practice to support students throughout their graduate careers. Assessments show that P3 students understand the transdisciplinary training concepts, have formed a beneficial and supportive community, and interact with diverse faculty outside of their home departments. To learn more about the P3 program, visit www.predictivephenomicsinplants.iastate.edu.

Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.