We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm-specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book-to-market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt. Copyright (c) 2010 the American Finance Association.

After the stock market crash of October 1987, the Brady Report (1988) and several academic researchers suggested the imposition of ''circuit breakers'' to prevent the market from fluctuating excessively. Most financial markets in the world have imposed circuit breaker systems, in the form of price limits and trading halts, in an attempt to reduce excessive market volatility. Similar to any other regulations, circuit breakers have proponents and opponents. In this survey, we analyze the benefits and costs of each type of circuit breaker, provide existing theoretical models and predictions related to each type of circuit breaker, and present findings from empirical studies to justify or disqualify the existence of circuit breakers. In addition, we synthesize existing studies and offer directions for further research in this area.

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We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance. The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation and GovernanceThis version: November, 2016Abstract We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.

We study China's experience with price limits by comparing a period with price limits to a period without price limits. Although many prior studies document costs of price limits, we show benefits of price limits. We find that price limits can facilitate price discovery, moderate transitory volatility, and mitigate abnormal trading activity. A tighter price limit for poorly performing stocks can also moderate volatility. We do not find evidence of a magnet effect, which suggests that prices gravitate to limit prices. Finally, we find evidence that price limits can facilitate market recovery following crashes.

We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.

PurposeBased on the intrinsic motivation theory and spiritual leadership theory, the current study proposes a chain mediation model for testing the linkage between spiritual leadership and employees' innovative behavior through individual values and role identity.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, 309 valid leader–subordinate matching questionnaires from 10 Internet enterprises and 21 manufacturing enterprises in China were collected through a field study. The hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping.FindingsThe results show that spiritual leadership has a positive impact on employees' innovative behavior. Uncertainty avoidance and creative role identity not only respectively play a mediating role but also play a chain mediating role in the process of spiritual leadership influencing employees' innovative behavior.Originality/valueThis study explores the influence of leadership style on employees' individual values, which has rarely been done in previous studies. Furthermore, the research explores the impact of personal values (uncertainty avoidance) on employee self-perception (creative role identity). And it enriches the relationship between spiritual leadership and employees' innovative behavior and reveals the deeper influence mechanism between them.

We use exchange-traded options to identify risks relevant to capital structure adjustments in firms. These forward-looking market-based risk measures provide significant explanatory power in predicting net leverage changes in excess of accounting data. They matter most during contractionary periods and for growth firms. We form market-based indices that capture firms' magnitudes of, and propensity for, net leverage increases. Firms with larger predicted leverage increases outperform firms with lower predicted increases by 3.1% to 3.9% per year in buy-andhold abnormal returns. Finally, consistent with the quality, leverage, and distress risk puzzles, firms with lower predicted leverage increases are riskier but earn lower abnormal returns.