A new rating system of automobile insurance for vehicle damage in Taiwan was launched in 1996, introducing a deductible that increases with the number of claims. In this article, we provide a theoretical rationale for the existence of an increasing per-claim deductible system and show that the new system is most likely an optimal choice for those insured who tend to have lower claims probability when incentives are present. Using a unique dynamic data set, we are able to conduct a natural experiment to examine the incentive effects (both positive and negative) by looking at the change in claim tendency before and after switching between two deductible plans: an increasing per-claim deductible and a zero deductible. Our results provide direct evidence of the effects of deductible structures on claim behavior. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2007.
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