One main result about the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement. This note provides two examples showing that this proposition cannot be generalized to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms. In these examples, price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm. This fact induces a cost saving that overcome the welfare loss from consumer misallocations associated to price discrimination. JEL classification numbers: D43, D60, L13
PurposeThe reader of Alfred Marshall writings confronts a variety of businessmen portraits that coexist along his epoch. The purpose of this paper is to describe Marshall's understanding of the capitalist‐owner concept, the way in which access to capital determined the emerging role played by entrepreneurs, the differences between entrepreneurs and managers in order to expose the characteristics that defined managerial activities.Design/methodology/approachA chronological review of Marshall writings revealed that the evolution of his ideas about entrepreneurship is associated to the role played by businessmen as capital owner, risk bearer, innovator, or administrator.FindingsMarshall's analysis is useful to explain: the problem that arises in the firm when property (capital owner) and control (manager) are separated (the principal‐agent relationship); why directors of today's firms are required to embody qualities as administrators (passive superintendents) and innovators (active entrepreneurs); and how to sort out the conflict that occurs in many family firms when the founder (entrepreneur) is unable to cope with the managerial complexities associated to growth (the Marshallian “cycle life” of business and entrepreneurs).Originality/valueSchumpeter is widely regarded in the economic literature as the one that developed the modern vision of businessmen as a risk bearer. We contend that this vision was already described by Marshall, as well as the distinction between the innovator (entrepreneur) and the orderly administrator of business (manager).
This paper presents and discusses the rent‐seeking process that occurred during Franco's regime in Spain (1939‐1975). Once the Civil War (1936‐1939) was over, those who won the war (militiaman, right‐wing factions) took control of the key positions in the new government. That meant the transfer of rents from the budget to veterans of war and their relatives, fuelled by the creation of an increasingly strong and well‐organised interest group. The author takes a public‐choice approach and is inspired by a similar study by R. Holcombe on the American Civil War.
La política cultural, económica y social del franquismo vino marcada por las características ideológicas del grupo que en cada momento controlaba la agenda del régimen. En un primer periodo (1939-57) esta pugna se establece entre falangistas y el grupo del CSIC/Arbor. En el segundo (1957-75) contenderán para tomar las riendas el grupo falangista y los tecnócratas. Es fácil postular la continuidad de ideas, aunque con personas distintas. Entre los falangistas la realización de su revolución pendiente será la guía de acción. Más problemática es la continuidad del 2º grupo. Es posible identificar vínculos entre los tradicionalistas y la institución religiosa Opus Dei. Pero subsiste la duda sobre la existencia de una estrategia tradicionalista/Opus Dei de control del Estado que se crearía como una plataforma cultural, para más tarde convertirse en proyecto político/económico.
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