Since first identified, the epidemic scale of the recently emerged novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Wuhan, China, has increased rapidly, with cases arising across China and other countries and regions. using a transmission model, we estimate a basic reproductive number of 3.11 (95%CI, 2.39-4.13); 58-76% of transmissions must be prevented to stop increasing; Wuhan case ascertainment of 5.0% (3.6-7.4); 21022 (11090-33490) total infections in Wuhan 1 to 22 January.

Since it was first identified, the epidemic scale of the recently emerged novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Wuhan, China, has increased rapidly, with cases arising across China and other countries and regions. Using a transmission model, we estimate a basic reproductive number of 3.11 (95% CI, 2.39–4.13), indicating that 58–76% of transmissions must be prevented to stop increasing. We also estimate a case ascertainment rate in Wuhan of 5.0% (95% CI, 3.6–7.4). The true size of the epidemic may be significantly greater than the published case counts suggest, with our model estimating 21 022 (prediction interval, 11 090–33 490) total infections in Wuhan between 1 and 22 January. We discuss our findings in the light of more recent information. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.

ObjectivesSotrovimab is one of several therapeutic agents that have been licensed to treat people at risk of severe outcomes following COVID-19 infection. However, there are concerns that it has reduced efficacy to treat people with the BA.2 sub-lineage of the Omicron (B.1.1.529) SARS-CoV-2 variant. We compared individuals with the BA.1 or BA.2 sub-lineage of the Omicron variant treated Sotrovimab in the community to assess their risk of hospital admission.MethodsWe performed a retrospective cohort study of individuals treated with Sotrovimab in the community and either had BA.1 or BA.2 variant classification.ResultsUsing a Stratified Cox regression model it was estimated that the hazard ratios (HR) of hospital admission with a length of stay of two or more days was 1.17 for BA.2 compared to BA.1 (95% CI 0.74-1.86) and for such admissions where COVID-19 ICD-10 codes was recorded the HR was 0.98 (95% CI 0.58-1.65).ConclusionThese results suggest that the risk of hospital admission is similar between BA.1 and BA.2 cases treated with Sotrovimab in the community.

The Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 became the globally dominant variant in early 2022. A sub-lineage of the Omicron variant (BA.2) was identified in England in January 2022. Here, we investigated hospitalisation and mortality risks of COVID-19 cases with the Omicron sub-lineage BA.2 (n = 258,875) compared to BA.1 (n = 984,337) in a large cohort study in England. We estimated the risk of hospital attendance, hospital admission or death using multivariable stratified proportional hazards regression models. After adjustment for confounders, BA.2 cases had lower or similar risks of death (HR = 0.80, 95% CI 0.71–0.90), hospital admission (HR = 0.88, 95% CI 0.83–0.94) and any hospital attendance (HR = 0.98, 95% CI 0.95–1.01). These findings that the risk of severe outcomes following infection with BA.2 SARS-CoV-2 was slightly lower or equivalent to the BA.1 sub-lineage can inform public health strategies in countries where BA.2 is spreading.

Aims: to investigate the spatiotemporal distribution of COVID-19 cases in England; to provide spatial quantification of risk at a high resolution; to provide information for prospective antigen and serological testing. Approach: We fit a spatiotemporal Negative Binomial generalised linear model to Public Health England SARS-CoV-2 testing data at the Lower Tier Local Authority region level. We assume an order-1 autoregressive model for case progression within regions, coupling discrete spatial units via observed commuting data and time-varying measures of traffic flow. We fit the model via maximum likelihood estimation in order to calculate region-specific risk of ongoing transmission, as well as measuring regional uncertainty in incidence. Results: We detect marked heterogeneity across England in COVID-19 incidence, not only in raw estimated incidence, but in the characteristics of within-region and between-region dynamics of PHE testing data. There is evidence for a spatially diverse set of regions having a higher daily increase of cases than others, having accounted for current case numbers, population size, and human mobility. Uncertainty in model estimates is generally greater in rural regions. Conclusions: A wide range of spatial heterogeneity in COVID-19 epidemic distribution and infection rate exists in England currently. Future work should incorporate fine-scaled demographic and health covariates, with continued improvement in spatially-detailed case reporting data. The method described here may be used to measure heterogeneity in real-time as behavioural and social interventions are relaxed, serving to identify "hotspots" of resurgent cases occurring in diverse areas of the country, and triggering locally-intensive surveillance and interventions as needed. Caveats: There is general concern over the ability of PHE testing data to capture the true prevalence of infection within the population, though this approach is designed to provide measures of spatial prevalence based on testing that can be used to guide further future testing effort. Now-casts of epidemic characteristics are presented based on testing data alone (as opposed to "true" prevalence in any one area). The model used in this analysis is phenomenological for ease and speed of principled parameter inference; we choose the model which best fits the current spatial case timeseries, without attempting to enforce "SIR"-type epidemic dynamics.

When SARS-CoV-2 Omicron emerged in 2021, S gene target failure enabled differentiation between Omicron and the dominant Delta variant. In England, where S gene target surveillance (SGTS) was already established, this led to rapid identification (within ca 3 days of sample collection) of possible Omicron cases, alongside real-time surveillance and modelling of Omicron growth. SGTS was key to public health action (including case identification and incident management), and we share applied insights on how and when to use SGTS.

Background Since 23 March 2020, social distancing measures have been implemented in the UK to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission. We conducted a cross-sectional survey to quantify and characterize non-household contact and to identify the effect of shielding and isolating on contact patterns. Methods Through an online questionnaire, the CoCoNet study measured daily interactions and mobility of 5143 participants between 28 July and 14 August 2020. Negative binomial regression modelling identified participant characteristics associated with contact rates. Results The mean rate of non-household contacts per person was 2.9 d-1. Participants attending a workplace (adjusted incidence rate ratio (aIRR) 3.33, 95%CI 3.02 to 3.66), self-employed (aIRR 1.63, 95%CI 1.43 to 1.87) or working in healthcare (aIRR 5.10, 95%CI 4.29 to 6.10) reported significantly higher non-household contact rates than those working from home. Participants self-isolating as a precaution or following Test and Trace instructions had a lower non-household contact rate than those not self-isolating (aIRR 0.58, 95%CI 0.43 to 0.79). We found limited evidence that those shielding had reduced non-household contacts compared to non-shielders. Conclusion The daily rate of non-household interactions remains lower than pre-pandemic levels, suggesting continued adherence to social distancing guidelines. Individuals attending a workplace in-person or employed as healthcare professionals were less likely to maintain social distance and had a higher non-household contact rate, possibly increasing their infection risk. Shielding and self-isolating individuals required greater support to enable them to follow the government guidelines and reduce non-household contact and therefore their risk of infection.

ObjectivesTo quantify and characterise non-household contact and to identify the effect of shielding and isolating on contact patterns.DesignCross-sectional study.Setting and participantsAnyone living in the UK was eligible to take part in the study. We recorded 5143 responses to the online questionnaire between 28 July 2020 and 14 August 2020.Outcome measuresOur primary outcome was the daily non-household contact rate of participants. Secondary outcomes were propensity to leave home over a 7 day period, whether contacts had occurred indoors or outdoors locations visited, the furthest distance travelled from home, ability to socially distance and membership of support bubble.ResultsThe mean rate of non-household contacts per person was 2.9 d-1. Participants attending a workplace (adjusted incidence rate ratio (aIRR) 3.33, 95% CI 3.02 to 3.66), self-employed (aIRR 1.63, 95% CI 1.43 to 1.87) or working in healthcare (aIRR 5.10, 95% CI 4.29 to 6.10) reported significantly higher non-household contact rates than those working from home. Participants self-isolating as a precaution or following Test and Trace instructions had a lower non-household contact rate than those not self-isolating (aIRR 0.58, 95% CI 0.43 to 0.79). We found limited evidence that those shielding had reduced non-household contacts compared with non-shielders.ConclusionThe daily rate of non-household interactions remained lower than prepandemic levels measured by other studies, suggesting continued adherence to social distancing guidelines. Individuals attending a workplace in-person or employed as healthcare professionals were less likely to maintain social distance and had a higher non-household contact rate, possibly increasing their infection risk. Shielding and self-isolating individuals required greater support to enable them to follow the government guidelines and reduce non-household contact and therefore their risk of infection.