Self -conscious emotions (e.g., shame, pride) are fundamentally important to a wide range of psychological processes, yet they have received relatively little attention compared to other, more "basic" emotions (e.g., sadness, joy) . This article outlines the unique features that distinguish self-conscious from basic emotions and then explains why generally accepted models of basic emotions do not adequately capture the self-conscious emotion process. The authors present a new model of self-conscious emotions, specify a set of predictions derived from the model, and apply the model to narcissistic self-esteem regulation. Finally, the authors discuss the model's broader implications for future research on self and emotion.Willy Loman, the protagonist of Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman, experiences such profound shame from failing to achieve the American dream that he commits suicide by the final act of the play. In William Shakespeare's Macbeth, Lady Macbeth is so overwhelmed by guilt after murdering her king, she hallucinates spots of blood on her hands and takes her own life. Oedipus, the tragic hero of Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, is plunged into epic shame when he realizes that he killed his father and married his mother. Oedipus refrains from suicide but stabs out his eyes so he will never have to look himself, or others, in the face again. And in Ovid's Metamorphoses, the infamous Narcissus is so consumed by pride that he chooses eternal self-reflection over the possibility of a meaningful romantic relationship.As these four stories illustrate, self-conscious emotions, such as shame, guilt, and pride, play a central role in motivating and regulating people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Campos, 1995;. Self-conscious emotions drive people to work hard in achievement and task domains (Stipek, 1995;Weiner, 1985), and to behave in moral, socially appropriate ways in their social interactions and intimate relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994;Leith & Baumeister, 1998;Retzinger, 1987). Most people spend a great deal of time avoiding social approbation, a strong elicitor of shame and embarrassment. We worry about losing social status in the eyes of others and, as Goffman (1955) noted, our every social act is influenced by even the slight chance of public shame or loss of face. In fact, according to the Cooley-Scheff Conjecture, we are "virtually always in a state of either pride or shame" (Scheff, 1988, p. 399).Researchers have linked self-conscious emotions to a wide variety of outcomes. Guilt, for example, has been found to be centrally involved in reparative and prosocial behaviors such as empathy, altruism, and caregiving (e.g., Batson, 1987;Baumeister et al., 1994;Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has been shown to mediate the negative emotional and physical health consequences of social stigma; victims of physical abuse (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 2002) and HIV-positive men (Kemeny, 2002) suffer poorer emotional and physical health if they feel ashamed of their stigma. Shame is also assoc...

To provide support for the theoretical distinction between 2 facets of pride, authentic and hubristic (J. L. Tracy & R. W. Robins, 2004a), the authors conducted 7 studies. Studies 1-4 demonstrate that the 2 facets (a) emerge in analyses of the semantic meaning of pride-related words, the dispositional tendency to experience pride, and reports of actual pride experiences; (b) have divergent personality correlates and distinct antecedent causal attributions; and (c) do not simply reflect positively and negatively valenced, high- and low-activation, or state versus trait forms of pride. In Studies 5-7, the authors develop and demonstrate the reliability and validity of brief, 7-item scales that can be used to assess the facets of pride in future research.

The pursuit of social rank is a recurrent and pervasive challenge faced by individuals in all human societies. Yet, the precise means through which individuals compete for social standing remains unclear. In 2 studies, we investigated the impact of 2 fundamental strategies-Dominance (the use of force and intimidation to induce fear) and Prestige (the sharing of expertise or know-how to gain respect)-on the attainment of social rank, which we conceptualized as the acquisition of (a) perceived influence over others (Study 1), (b) actual influence over others' behaviors (Study 1), and (c) others' visual attention (Study 2). Study 1 examined the process of hierarchy formation among a group of previously unacquainted individuals, who provided round-robin judgments of each other after completing a group task. Results indicated that the adoption of either a Dominance or Prestige strategy promoted perceptions of greater influence, by both group members and outside observers, and higher levels of actual influence, based on a behavioral measure. These effects were not driven by popularity; in fact, those who adopted a Prestige strategy were viewed as likable, whereas those who adopted a Dominance strategy were not well liked. In Study 2, participants viewed brief video clips of group interactions from Study 1 while their gaze was monitored with an eye tracker. Dominant and Prestigious targets each received greater visual attention than targets low on either dimension. Together, these findings demonstrate that Dominance and Prestige are distinct yet viable strategies for ascending the social hierarchy, consistent with evolutionary theory.

No abstract

This study provides a comprehensive picture of age differences in self-esteem from age 9 to 90 years using cross-sectional data collected from 326,641 individuals over the Internet. Self-esteem levels were high in childhood, dropped during adolescence, rose gradually throughout adulthood, and declined sharply in old age. This trajectory generally held across gender, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and nationality (U.S. citizens vs. non-U.S. citizens). Overall, these findings support previous research, help clarify inconsistencies in the literature, and document new trends that require further investigation.

Suppressor situations occur when the addition of a new predictor improves the validity of a predictor variable already in the equation. A common allegation is that suppressor effects rarely replicate and have little substantive import. We present substantive examples from two established research domains to counter this skepticism. In the first domain, we show how measures of guilt and shame act consistently as mutual suppressors: Adding shame into a regression equation increases the negative association between guilt and aggression, whereas adding guilt increases the positive association between shame and aggression. In the second domain, we show how the effects of self-esteem and narcissism operate consistently as mutual suppressors: That is, adding narcissism into a regression equation increases the negative association between self-esteem and antisocial behavior, whereas adding self-esteem increases the positive association between narcissism and antisocial behavior. Discussion addresses the different implications for suppressors in theoretical and variable selection applications.

Four studies used experimental and correlational methods to test predictions about the antecedents of shame and guilt derived from an appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Results were consistent with the predicted relations between appraisals (i.e., causal attributions) and emotions. Specifically, (a) internal attributions were positively related to both shame and guilt; (b) the chronic tendency to make external attributions was positively related to the tendency to experience shame; and (c) internal, stable, uncontrollable attributions for failure were positively related to shame, whereas internal, unstable, controllable attributions for failure were positively related to guilt. Emotions and attributions were assessed using a variety of methods, so converging results across studies indicate the robustness of the findings and provide support for the theoretical model.

No abstract