Tocqueville's claim in Democracy in America about the link between associations and a vibrant public sphere is interpreted especially by neo-republicans in political theory as aligned with their argument that civic virtue can and ought to be fostered in today's democracies. This paper challenges such a reading of Tocqueville by considering his notion of enlightened self-interest. Tocqueville's ideas about the nature of political activity differ markedly from the republican ideal of a citizenry marked by civic virtue, as Tocqueville appeals to self-interest, albeit an enlightened sort, as the primary motive for involvement. Tocqueville also suggests that the character of political behaviour he describes in contrast to civic virtue contributes to a more nuanced understanding of what motivates citizens to engage in public life in modern democracy. KeywordsTocqueville, enlightened self-interest, civic virtue, neo-republicanism, ViroliAlexis de Tocqueville argued in Democracy in America that a crucial link existed between associations and a vibrant public sphere. A number of political theorists have interpreted this to mean that local political associations and civil society foster civic virtue, and virtuous citizens, as Tocqueville allegedly said, defend freedom against the constant threat of despotism. The problem is that such a reading especially in neo-republicanism rests on a misinterpretation of what Tocqueville says about the kind of citizen -or more specifically the motivation of individuals to participate in the public sphere -on which freedom depends. For Tocqueville, American democracy departed from a republican notion of civic virtue. This becomes evident upon examination of his concept of enlightened self-interest,

In this paper, I demonstrate that neo-republicanism, as found in the works of Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, Iseult Honohan, and John Maynor, is underpinned by a conception of the well-ordered republic derived from the classical republican tradition. I also argue that an alternative, modern framework of the republic and its political stability emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and is captured in the work of thinkers like Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. Neo-republicanism, however, collapses these distinct conceptions of political order. It does so in some cases by misinterpreting these nineteenth-century figures as representing the continuation of the classical perspective that calls for virtuous political participation to secure freedom. It does so in others by aligning with a classical framework of political order and yet not seeing its core conundrum as problematic, perhaps because of adopting assumptions associated with an optimistic perspective on social and political change. What is more, even if neither were a problem, neo-republicanism, in its appeal to a classical tradition, overlooks a relevant body of work which dealt with key republican concerns from within the context of increasingly commercial and heterogeneous societies.