Cognition presents evolutionary research with one of its greatest challenges. Cognitive evolution has been explained at the proximate level by shifts in absolute and relative brain volume and at the ultimate level by differences in social and dietary complexity. However, no study has integrated the experimental and phylogenetic approach at the scale required to rigorously test these explanations. Instead, previous research has largely relied on various measures of brain size as proxies for cognitive abilities. We experimentally evaluated these major evolutionary explanations by quantitatively comparing the cognitive performance of 567 individuals representing 36 species on two problem-solving tasks measuring self-control. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that absolute brain volume best predicted performance across species and accounted for considerably more variance than brain volume controlling for body mass. This result corroborates recent advances in evolutionary neurobiology and illustrates the cognitive consequences of cortical reorganization through increases in brain volume. Within primates, dietary breadth but not social group size was a strong predictor of species differences in self-control. Our results implicate robust evolutionary relationships between dietary breadth, absolute brain volume, and self-control. These findings provide a significant first step toward quantifying the primate cognitive phenome and explaining the process of cognitive evolution.psychology | behavior | comparative methods | inhibitory control | executive function S ince Darwin, understanding the evolution of cognition has been widely regarded as one of the greatest challenges for evolutionary research (1). Although researchers have identified surprising cognitive flexibility in a range of species (2-40) and potentially derived features of human psychology (41-61), we know much less about the major forces shaping cognitive evolution (62-71). With the notable exception of Bitterman's landmark studies conducted several decades ago (63, 72-74), most research comparing cognition across species has been limited to small taxonomic samples (70, 75). With limited comparable experimental data on how cognition varies across species, previous research has largely relied on proxies for cognition (e.g., brain size) or metaanalyses when testing hypotheses about cognitive evolution (76-92). The lack of cognitive data collected with similar methods across large samples of species precludes meaningful species comparisons that can reveal the major forces shaping cognitive evolution across species, including humans (48,70,89,(93)(94)(95)(96)(97)(98). SignificanceAlthough scientists have identified surprising cognitive flexibility in animals and potentially unique features of human psychology, we know less about the selective forces that favor cognitive evolution, or the proximate biological mechanisms underlying this process. We tested 36 species in two problemsolving tasks measuring self-control and evaluated the leading hypotheses regarding how ...

Adult humans, infants, pre-school children, and non-human animals appear to share a system of approximate numerical processing for non-symbolic stimuli such as arrays of dots or sequences of tones. Behavioral studies of adult humans implicate a link between these non-symbolic numerical abilities and symbolic numerical processing (e.g., similar distance effects in accuracy and reaction-time for arrays of dots and Arabic numerals). However, neuroimaging studies have remained inconclusive on the neural basis of this link. The intraparietal sulcus (IPS) is known to respond selectively to symbolic numerical stimuli such as Arabic numerals. Recent studies, however, have arrived at conflicting conclusions regarding the role of the IPS in processing non-symbolic, numerosity arrays in adulthood, and very little is known about the brain basis of numerical processing early in development. Addressing the question of whether there is an early-developing neural basis for abstract numerical processing is essential for understanding the cognitive origins of our uniquely human capacity for math and science. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) at 4-Tesla and an event-related fMRI adaptation paradigm, we found that adults showed a greater IPS response to visual arrays that deviated from standard stimuli in their number of elements, than to stimuli that deviated in local element shape. These results support previous claims that there is a neurophysiological link between non-symbolic and symbolic numerical processing in adulthood. In parallel, we tested 4-y-old children with the same fMRI adaptation paradigm as adults to determine whether the neural locus of non-symbolic numerical activity in adults shows continuity in function over development. We found that the IPS responded to numerical deviants similarly in 4-y-old children and adults. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that the neural locus of adult numerical cognition takes form early in development, prior to sophisticated symbolic numerical experience. More broadly, this is also, to our knowledge, the first cognitive fMRI study to test healthy children as young as 4 y, providing new insights into the neurophysiology of human cognitive development.

In a world without numbers, we would be unable to build a skyscraper, hold a national election, plan a wedding, or pay for a chicken at the market. The numerical symbols used in all these behaviors build on the approximate number system (ANS) which represents the number of discrete objects or events as a continuous mental magnitude. In this review, we first discuss evidence that the ANS bears a set of behavioral and brain signatures that are universally displayed across animal species, human cultures, and development. We then turn to the question of whether the ANS constitutes a specialized cognitive and neural domain--a question central to understanding how this system works, the nature of its evolutionary and developmental trajectory, and its physical instantiation in the brain.

There is increasing evidence that animals share with adult humans and perhaps human infants a system for representing objective number as psychological magnitudes that are an analogue of the quantities they represent. Here we show that rhesus monkeys can extend a numerical rule learned with the values 1 through 9 to the values 10, 15, 20, and 30, which suggests that there is no upper limit on a monkey's numerical capacity. Instead, throughout the numerical range tested, both accuracy and latency in ordering two numerical values were systematically controlled by the ratio of the values compared. In a second experiment, we directly compared humans' and monkeys' performance in the same ordinal comparison task. The qualitative and quantitative similarity in their performance provides the strongest evidence to date of a single nonverbal, evolutionarily primitive mechanism for representing and comparing numerical values.