SUMMARYIn November 2009, we initiated a multistate investigation of Salmonella Montevideo infections with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis pattern JIXX01.0011. We identified 272 cases in 44 states with illness onset dates ranging from 1 July 2009 to 14 April 2010. To help generate hypotheses, warehouse store membership card information was collected to identify products consumed by cases. These records identified 19 ill persons who purchased company A salami products before onset of illness. A case-control study was conducted. Ready-to-eat salami consumption was significantly associated with illness (matched odds ratio 8·5, 95% confidence interval 2·1–75·9). The outbreak strain was isolated from company A salami products from an environmental sample from one manufacturing plant, and sealed containers of black and red pepper at the facility. This outbreak illustrates the importance of using membership card information to assist in identifying suspect vehicles, the potential for spices to contaminate ready-to-eat products, and preventing raw ingredient contamination of these products.

On 23 May 2011, CDC identified a multistate cluster of Salmonella Heidelberg infections and two multidrug-resistant (MDR) isolates from ground turkey retail samples with indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. We defined cases as isolation of outbreak strains in persons with illness onset between 27 February 2011 and 10 November 2011. Investigators collected hypothesis-generating questionnaires and shopper-card information. Food samples from homes and retail outlets were collected and cultured. We identified 136 cases of S. Heidelberg infection in 34 states. Shopper-card information, leftover ground turkey from a patient's home containing the outbreak strain and identical antimicrobial resistance profiles of clinical and retail samples pointed to plant A as the source. On 3 August, plant A recalled 36 million pounds of ground turkey. This outbreak increased consumer interest in MDR Salmonella infections acquired through United States-produced poultry and played a vital role in strengthening food safety policies related to Salmonella and raw ground poultry.

Human salmonellosis linked to contact with live poultry is an increasing public health concern. In 2012, eight unrelated outbreaks of human salmonellosis linked to live poultry contact resulted in 517 illnesses. In July 2012, PulseNet, a national molecular surveillance network, reported a multistate cluster of a rare strain of Salmonella Braenderup infections which we investigated. We defined a case as infection with the outbreak strain, determined by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, with illness onset from 25 July 2012-27 February 2013. Ill persons and mail-order hatchery (MOH) owners were interviewed using standardized questionnaires. Traceback and environmental investigations were conducted. We identified 48 cases in 24 states. Twenty-six (81%) of 32 ill persons reported live poultry contact in the week before illness; case-patients named 12 different MOHs from eight states. The investigation identified hatchery D as the ultimate poultry source. Sampling at hatchery D yielded the outbreak strain. Hatchery D improved sanitation procedures and pest control; subsequent sampling failed to yield Salmonella. This outbreak highlights the interconnectedness of humans, animals, and the environment and the importance of industry knowledge and involvement in solving complex outbreaks. Preventing these infections requires a 'One Health' approach that leverages expertise in human, animal, and environmental health.

An outbreak of Salmonella serotype Montevideo infections associated with multiple locations of restaurant chain A in Phoenix, AZ, was identified in July 2008. One infected individual reported eating at a chain A catered luncheon where others fell ill; we conducted a cohort study among attendees to identify the vehicle. Food and environmental samples collected at six chain A locations were cultured for Salmonella. Restaurant inspection results were compared among 18 chain A locations. Routine surveillance identified 58 Arizona residents infected with the outbreak strain. Three chain A locations, one of which catered the luncheon, were named by two or more case patients as a meal source in the week prior to illness onset. In the cohort study of luncheon attendees, 30 reported illness, 10 of which were later culture confirmed. Illness was reported by 30 (61%) of 49 attendees who ate chicken and by 0 of 7 who did not. The outbreak strain was isolated from two of these three locations from uncooked chicken in marinade, chopped cilantro, and a cutting board dedicated to cutting cooked chicken. Raw chicken, contaminated before arrival at the restaurant, was the apparent source of this outbreak. The three locations where two or more case patients ate had critical violations upon routine inspection, while 15 other locations received none. Poor hygiene likely led to cross-contamination of food and work areas. This outbreak supports the potential use of inspections in identifying restaurants at high risk of outbreaks and the need to reduce contamination of raw products at the source and prevent cross-contamination at the point of service.

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A norovirus outbreak in a resort hotel resulted in substantial indirect costs and loss of vacation days to ill travellers. We recommend outbreak control measures including exclusion of ill employees, until ≥48-72 h after resolution of symptoms, self-isolation of ill guests and appropriate cleaning in hotel-associated norovirus outbreaks.