We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance ( p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion ( p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen’s ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.

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We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance to examine variation in effect magnitudes across sample and setting. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples and 15,305 total participants from 36 countries and territories. Using conventional statistical significance (p &lt; .05), fifteen (54%) of the replications provided evidence in the same direction and statistically significant as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p &lt; .0001), fourteen (50%) provide such evidence reflecting the extremely high powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications had effect sizes larger than the original finding and 21 (75%) had effect sizes smaller than the original finding. The median comparable Cohen’s d effect sizes for original findings was 0.60 and for replications was 0.15. Sixteen replications (57%) had small effect sizes (&lt; .20) and 9 (32%) were in the opposite direction from the original finding. Across settings, 11 (39%) showed significant heterogeneity using the Q statistic and most of those were among the findings eliciting the largest overall effect sizes; only one effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity. Only one effect showed a Tau &gt; 0.20 indicating moderate heterogeneity. Nine others had a Tau near or slightly above 0.10 indicating slight heterogeneity. In moderation tests, very little heterogeneity was attributable to task order, administration in lab versus online, and exploratory WEIRD versus less WEIRD culture comparisons. Cumulatively, variability in observed effect sizes was more attributable to the effect being studied than the sample or setting in which it was studied.

Recent theorizing applying the social identity approach to leadership proposes a four‐dimensional model of identity leadership that centres on leaders’ management of a shared sense of ‘we’ and ‘us’. This research validates a scale assessing this model – the Identity Leadership Inventory (ILI). We present results from an international project with data from all six continents and from more than 20 countries/regions with 5,290 participants. The ILI was translated (using back‐translation methods) into 13 different languages (available in the Appendix ) and used along with measures of other leadership constructs (i.e., leader–member exchange [LMX], transformational leadership, and authentic leadership) as well as employee attitudes and (self‐reported) behaviours – namely identification, trust in the leader, job satisfaction, innovative work behaviour, organizational citizenship behaviour, and burnout. Results provide consistent support for the construct, discriminant, and criterion validity of the ILI across countries. We show that the four dimensions of identity leadership are distinguishable and that they relate to important work‐related attitudes and behaviours above and beyond other leadership constructs. Finally, we also validate a short form of the ILI, noting that is likely to have particular utility in applied contexts. Practitioner points The Identity Leadership Inventory (ILI) has a consistent factor structure and high predictive value across 20 countries and can thus be used to assess a leader's ability to manage (team and organizational) identities in a range of national and cultural contexts. Identity leadership as perceived by employees is uniquely related to important indicators of leadership effectiveness including employees’ relationship to their team (identification and perceived team support), well‐being (job satisfaction and reduced burnout), and performance (citizenship and innovative behaviour at work). The ILI can be used in practical settings to assess and develop leadership, for instance, in 360‐degree feedback systems. The short form of the ILI is also a valid assessment of identity leadership, and this is likely to be useful in a range of applied contexts (e.g., those where there is a premium on cost and time or when comparing multiple leaders or multiple time points).

In step-level public good dilemmas the equality rule serves as an important distribution rule to tacitly coordinate group members' decisions. In two studies, we examined the motives that may underlie the use of the equality rule. More specifically, we examined whether people use the equality rule out of fairness concerns or out of efficiency concerns. For this purpose, we assessed people's emotional reactions toward a violator of the equality rule when the group succeeded vs. failed, as a function of social value orientation. The results of both experiments showed that proselfs' emotional reactions towards a violator were a function of the success or the failure of the group, whereas prosocials' emotional reactions did not vary as a function of the outcome feedback. These results suggest that prosocials prefer the equality rule out of fairness concerns whereas for proselfs efficiency concerns dominate. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.In society, personal and collective interests are often at odds (Dawes, 1980). This particular situation is referred to as a social dilemma (e.g. Komorita & Parks, 1994). A social dilemma is an interdependence situation, in which people can choose to cooperate or not. An example of a social dilemma is the existence of unions that protect the rights of employees. At the individual level it is more profitable for a union member not to pay his or her membership contribution and to still enjoy the benefits of being a member. However, if every member chose this option, the union would not be maintained and everyone would be worse off than if all decided to pay their membership contribution. This situation can be defined as a particular type of social dilemma, more specifically, a public good dilemma.Several forms of public good dilemmas exist. One common form is the step-level public good dilemma. In these types of dilemmas a certain threshold has to be reached in order to provide the public good. How do people decide on their contributions in step-level public good dilemmas? Based on research on coordination rules (Schelling, 1980) it is suggested that under such circumstances people use 'coordination rules' to tacitly coordinate their decisions (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). One such coordination rule is the equality rule, which prescribes that people divide the threshold that has to be surpassed by the total number of members ( ¼ equal share) to determine how much they should contribute (e.g. Biel, Von Borgstede, & Dahlstrand, 1999;Deutsch, 1975Deutsch, , 1985Deutsch & Gerard, 1955;Lane, 1986;van Dijk & Wilke, 1995van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999). Why do people use the equality rule in step-level public good dilemmas? The present research attempts to identify which motives underlie people's preference for an equality rule in step-level public good dilemmas. More specifically, it will be examined whether people evaluate the use of the equality rule in terms of concerns for efficiency (Messick, 1993) or in terms of concerns for fairness (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). EQUALIT...