This essay demonstrates that the study of world politics should be situated in a cognitive approach, along with the study of foreign policymaking. As I will show, the so‐called “rationality‐cognitive debate” has become a pseudo‐debate. Theories of both foreign policy and world politics must be realistically grounded in the assumptions and knowledge of cognitive actors to advance our grasp of practice as well as theory. The basic assumptions of the approach are described and the accumulated knowledge is reviewed in five critical areas: 1) the content of policymaker beliefs (from general images to specific preferences); 2) the organization and structure of policymaker beliefs (resulting in coherent versus fragmented images); 3) the common patterns of perception and misperception (such as the tendency to categorize and stereotype, simplify causal inferences, and use historical analogies); 4) the likelihood of cognitive rigidity to limit change and learning; and 5) the impact on policymaking (agenda‐setting and framing, and formulation and choice). Although sensitivity to variation in cognition across individuals and cultures is increasingly important, international relations scholars cannot ignore the insights about human cognition if their theories are to reflect international realities.

The bureaucratic politics model has achieved great popularity in the study of decision making. Yet too often the term “bureaucratic politics” is used by scholars and practitioners without clearly stating its policy application. The decision-making behavior that occurred during the Johnson and Nixon administrations for SALT I serves to illustrate many of the limits of the model. First, the decision-making structure posited by the bureaucratic politics model is not nearly as prevalent within the executive branch as is commonly assumed. Second, even where the bureaucratic politics structure is present, the decision-making process is not always one of bargaining, compromise, and consensus. Finally, the decision context and the decision participants are ignored in the model. To provide a clearer understanding of policy-making behavior, a more systematic decision-making framework is offered, which should contribute to the development of better model- and theory-building.

With the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years, there has been a resurgence in examining the beliefs of the public and their role in U.S. foreign policy. The most extensive of these studies has been conducted by Holsti and Rosenau who have found first three and then four competing schools of thought. Our purpose is to build off Holsti and Rosenau's analyses and extend their argument. Research based on the content analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1980-1989 demonstrates that there is more diversity and complexity in the range and content of beliefs held by American leaders than Holsti and Rosenau have yet been able to capture through their "three-" and "four-headed eagles." Although the three-headed eagle serves as a useful scheme for categorizing the broad foreign policy perspectives of American leaders, it de-emphasizes important differences in beliefs and ignores at least two foreign policy orientations that exist within their general categories. This is not a mere academic exercise, for it sheds light on the level of diversity and complexity of elite beliefs, which enriches an understanding of the politics of U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam. A preliminary examination of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1990 to 1994 indicates that American elites are changing and adapting while at the same time, they are absorbing profound global changes into their prevailing belief systems, as predicted by the political psychological literature. This suggests that the diversity and complexity present in the 80s is likely to persist and grow throughout the 90s. Our research also suggests the importance of developing alternative methods to complement reliance on survey research in order to capture more fully the diversity and complexity of the foreign policy beliefs of Americans.KEY WORDS: elite attitudes; attitude change; ideology; foreign policy orientations; U.S. foreign policy; content analysis; foreign policy and national opinion journals

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