This paper presents the first survey evidence about the agent and associated event which triggers the establishment of a works council. We argue that the request of risk protection is a relevant trigger mechanism and show that an organisational shock causes the establishing of a works council. We argue that an organisational shock increases uncertainty of the workforce based on information asymmetries about the security of the workplaces. Furthermore, we show that the workforce alone calls for election in around two third of all cases and in the other third, the management was involved in the establishment. Here, the management values the expected productivity enhancement more than the potential rent redistribution.JEL Classification: J53, J32, J83, M54

This study provides the first econometric analysis on the dynamic dimension of establishmentlevel codetermination in Germany. We hypothesize that learning implies a change in the nature and scope of codetermination over time. Using unique data from small-and medium-sized establishments, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence that learning indeed plays a crucial role in the functioning of works councils. First, the probability of an adversarial relationship between management and works council is decreasing in the age of the council. Second, the council's age is positively associated with the probability that the council has an influence even on decisions where it has no legal powers. Third, productivity is increasing in the age of the council. Fourth, the quit rate is decreasing in the age of the council. However, the estimates also provide evidence of a codetermination life cycle.

Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that the managerial environment has a strong influence on the introduction and survival of works councils. Employees in owner‐managed establishments are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if the establishment is owner‐managed. The pattern of results even holds in situations that involve positive economic effects of works councils. This suggests that owner‐managers oppose works councils not primarily for economic reasons. Our findings are rather consistent with the hypothesis that owner‐managers oppose co‐determination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayDownload this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08019.pdf sources of estimation bias and reversed causality. Our paper shows that it is necessary to discriminate between different groups of occupations when assessing the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. In particular, we find that the share of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a positive impact on contemporary gross profits and the apprentices are substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, an increase in the share of apprentices in the manufacturing occupations reduces contemporary gross profits.This means that enterprises offering apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations do not cover their training costs during the apprenticeship period. The apprenticeship training rather is a human capital investment. This paper demonstrates the efficiency of the German apprenticeship system: it allows companies to provide general and occupation-specific skills in highly specified occupations such as manufacturing. Otherwise, it offers cost-neutral apprenticeships in occupations where skills are more general and the mobility is higher, such as commercial or trade occupations. ABSTRACT This paper investigates the short-term costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany. It calls into question the popular stylised fact that apprenticeship training always leads to net costs during the apprenticeship period. We analyse the impact of the proportion of different occupational groups of apprentices on firm performance. We use representative matched employer-employee panel data that allow us to correct for different sources of estimation bias. We show that the proportion of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a direct positive impact on firm performance: the companies cover their training costs immediately. In contrast, companies with apprentices in the manufacturing occupations face net training costs during the apprenticeship period but gain by the long-term employment of its graduate apprentices. WHY DO FIRMS TRAIN APPRENT...

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08019.pdf sources of estimation bias and reversed causality. Our paper shows that it is necessary to discriminate between different groups of occupations when assessing the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. In particular, we find that the share of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a positive impact on contemporary gross profits and the apprentices are substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, an increase in the share of apprentices in the manufacturing occupations reduces contemporary gross profits.This means that enterprises offering apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations do not cover their training costs during the apprenticeship period. The apprenticeship training rather is a human capital investment. This paper demonstrates the efficiency of the German apprenticeship system: it allows companies to provide general and occupation-specific skills in highly specified occupations such as manufacturing. Otherwise, it offers cost-neutral apprenticeships in occupations where skills are more general and the mobility is higher, such as commercial or trade occupations. ABSTRACT This paper investigates the short-term costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany. It calls into question the popular stylised fact that apprenticeship training always leads to net costs during the apprenticeship period. We analyse the impact of the proportion of different occupational groups of apprentices on firm performance. We use representative matched employer-employee panel data that allow us to correct for different sources of estimation bias. We show that the proportion of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a direct positive impact on firm performance: the companies cover their training costs immediately. In contrast, companies with apprentices in the manufacturing occupations face net training costs during the apprenticeship period but gain by the long-term employment of its graduate apprentices. WHY DO FIRMS TRAIN APPRENTICESJEL Classification: C33, D24, J24

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to derive an empirical method to identify different types of training strategies of companies based on publicly available company data. Design/methodology/approach -Using a ten-year panel, the within-firm retention rate, defined as the average proportion of apprentices staying in a company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of a company over several years, was analyzed. The within-firm retention rate is used to identify these companies' training strategies. Findings -It was shown that companies' motivation for apprenticeship training in Germany is not homogeneous: 19 percent of all companies follow a substitution strategy and 44 percent follow an investment strategy. The determinants of the substitution strategy were estimated and, for example, sizeable differences were found between sectors with different skill requirements and between firms' coverage of industrial relations.Research limitations/implications -The method is well suited to classify substitution-motivated training firms but it is less precise in identifying the investment motivation. Moreover, very small firms which train only one apprentice need longer panel duration for precise results and therefore the classification results are less precise for very small firms. Practical implications -The classification can be used to identify determinants of company participation in apprenticeship training and to predict changes in demand for apprentices. Originality/value -A simple and innovative method of identifying different types of training motivation with publicly available company data was derived, which has so far been possible only with very detailed company-specific apprenticeship surveys.

A series of seminal papers argues that poaching hampers company-sponsored general training. Empirically, however, the existence and extent of poaching remain open questions. We provide a novel empirical strategy to identify poaching. We find that only few apprenticeship training firms in Germany are 'poaching victims' or 'poaching raiders'. Victims are more likely to be in a temporary downturn and raiders are more likely to be growing. Victims hardly change their training strategy after poaching and poaching seems be a transitory event. This is an important result for countries that intend to introduce apprenticeship-type training and need to convince firms to participate in training.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new data source available for researchers with interest in human resources management (HRM) and personnel economics, the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP). Design/methodology/approach – The LPP is a longitudinal and representative employer-employee data set covering establishments in Germany and a subset of their workforce and is designed for quantitative empirical human resource research. Findings – The LPP employee survey applies a number of established scales to measure job characteristics and job perceptions, personal characteristics, employee attitudes towards the organization and employee behaviour. This paper gives an overview of both the employer and employee survey and outlines the definitions, origins, and statistical properties of the scales used in the individual questionnaire. Practical implications – The paper describes how researchers can access the data. Originality/value – First, the data set combines employer and employee surveys that can be matched to each other. Second, it can also be linked to a number of additional administrative data sets. Third, the LPP covers a wide range of firms and workers from different backgrounds. Finally, because of its longitudinal dimension, the LPP should facilitate the study of causal effects of HRM practices.