Three studies examined the effects of context on decisions about the reality status of novel entities. In Experiment 1 (144, 3- to 5-year-olds), participants less often claimed that novel entities were real when they were introduced in a fantastical than in a scientific context. Experiment 2 (61, 4- to 5-year-olds) revealed that defining novel entities with reference to scientific entities had a stronger effect on reality status judgments than did hearing scientifically oriented stories before encountering the novel entities. The results from Experiment 3 (192, 3- to 6-year-olds) indicated that definitions that support inferences facilitate reality status judgments more than do definitions that simply associate novel and familiar entities. These findings demonstrate that children share with adults an important means of assessing reality status.

Past research has focused on pretend play in infants with autism because it is considered an early manifestation of symbolic or imaginative thinking. Contradictory research findings have challenged the meta-representational model. The intent of this paper is to propose that pretend play is the behavioral manifestation of developing imaginative ability, the complexity of which is determined by the degree of progression from part-object/inanimate object to whole-object/human object identification. We propose that autism is the result of non-completion of this process to varying degrees. This not only affects early pretend play behaviors, but also later social, language, and cognitive skills derived from the level of imagination-based sophistication achieved during foundational periods available for early identification.

The present research explores the role of inhibitory control in young preschoolers’ pretense ability using an ego depletion paradigm. In Experiment 1 (N = 56), children’s pretense ability was assessed either before or after participating in conflict inhibitory control or control tasks, and in Experiment 2 (N = 36), pretense ability was measured after children engaged in either conflict or delay inhibitory control tasks. In both experiments, pretense scores were significantly higher only after engaging in conflict inhibitory control tasks. Further, pretense scores were positively correlated with inhibitory control scores when conflict inhibitory control was not experienced first. This pattern of results suggests that inhibitory control may underlie pretense, and conflict inhibitory control can boost the quality of children’s subsequent pretending.

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Is it wrong to pretend to kick or pretend to steal? The current experiment examined whether preschoolers extend their moral principles from reality into pretense and whether this transfer depends on the proximity of the pretend world to the real world. Children are known to transfer their knowledge of object properties, causality, and problem solutions between pretend and real worlds. However, do children maintain their real-world moral reasoning in pretense? Preschoolers (N = 63) judged the acceptability of antisocial behaviors in pretend, fantastical, or non-pretend scenarios. Children found antisocial behaviors to be equally unacceptable in both pretend and non-pretend situations but found antisocial behaviors to be more acceptable in the fantastical situations. These results imply that children extend their real-world representations of morality in pretense, but more so for pretend scenarios that are similar to the real world. Implications for children’s understanding of the reality-fantasy boundary and moral reasoning are discussed.