Decision-Making by Children *In this paper, we examine the determinants of decision-making power by children and young adolescents. Moving beyond previous economic models that treat children as goods consumed by adults rather than agents, we develop a noncooperative model of parental control of child behavior and child resistance. Using child reports of decision-making and psychological and cognitive measures from the NLSY79 Child Supplement, we examine the determinants of shared and sole decision-making in seven domains of child activity. We find that the determinants of sole decision-making by the child and shared decision-making with parents are quite distinct: sharing decisions appears to be a form of parental investment in child development rather than a simple stage in the transfer of authority. In addition, we find that indicators of child capability and preferences affect reports of decision-making authority in ways that suggest child demand for autonomy as well as parental discretion in determining these outcomes. JEL Classification:D1, J13

We analyze ethnographic data on 42 families' perceptions and uses of the EITC, including the decision to use the lump sum or advance payment form. A behavioral life cycle (BLC) model lends a theoretical framework and a description of family financial situations provides context. Parents discuss and exhibit a strong preference for a lump sum combined tax refund and EITC over the credit's advance payment option. We argue that the preference aligns with the BLC model and is rational given scarce time, money, and personal energy. We conclude with implications and hypotheses for quantitative investigation of labor supply and well being issues.

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The combination of a progressive tax system with credits for low-income workers and means-tested transfer programs can create high marginal tax rates (MTRs) on earned income. We document the extent and distribution of statutory and actual MTRs for Wisconsin households with earned income in 2000 using a unique data set of merged tax, transfer program, and wage data. Nearly a quarter of unmarried tax fi lers with two or more dependents face MTRs of 50 percent or greater. Households between 100 percent and 250 percent of the federal poverty threshold and those using multiple means-tested programs are more likely to face high rates. "The possible work disincentives and other effi ciencies created by the existence of multiple transfer programs is one of the most important, and one of the oldest, issues in the economics of transfer programs in the U.S.A."-Keane and Moffi tt (1998) "It's like being persecuted for getting a raise."-"Karen H." A Wisconsin home health care worker, upon fi nding out that her food stamps and housing assistance were reduced after she received a legislatively-mandated hourly wage increase (Romich, 2006