The notion of transformation is gaining traction in contemporary sustainability debates. New ways of theorising and supporting transformations are emerging and, so the argument goes, opening exciting spaces to (re)imagine and (re)structure radically different futures. Yet, questions remain about how the term is being translated from an academic concept into an assemblage of normative policies and practices, and how this process might shape social, political, and environmental change. Motivated by these questions, we identify five latent risks associated with discourse that frames transformation as apolitical and/or inevitable. We refer to these risks as the dark side of transformation. While we cannot predict the future of radical transformations towards sustainability, we suggest that scientists, policymakers, and practitioners need to consider such change in more inherently plural and political ways.

The global rush to develop the 'blue economy' risks harming both the marine environment and human wellbeing. Proactive, systematic and bold policies and actions are urgently required to chart an environmentally sustainable and socially equitable course for the blue economy.Concerns about the state of the world's oceans are widespread 1,2 . At the same time, interest in their untapped economic potential is escalating. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that the contribution of the ocean to global GDP could double from US$1.5 trillion in 2010 to US$3 trillion by 2030 3 . Ocean sectors, including fisheries, aquaculture, marine tourism, bio-prospecting, seabed mining, oil and gas, renewable energy, and shipping, are heralded by numerous actors and nations as lucrative frontiers for investment. The 'blue economy' -a term that encapsulates international interest in the growth of ocean-based economic development -has been a central theme in numerous recent global ocean policy conferences 4,5 .

In this article, we track a relatively new term in global environmental governance: "blue economy." Analyzing preparatory documentation and data collected at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (i.e., Rio þ 20), we show how the term entered into use and how it was articulated within four competing discourses regarding human-ocean relations: (a) oceans as natural capital, (b) oceans as good business, (c) oceans as integral to Pacific Small Island Developing States, and (d) oceans as small-scale fisheries livelihoods. Blue economy was consistently invoked to connect oceans with Rio þ 20's "green economy" theme; however, different actors worked to further define the term in ways that prioritized particular oceans problems, solutions, and participants. It is not clear whether blue economy will eventually be understood singularly or as the domain of a particular actor or discourse. We explore possibilities as well as discuss discourse in global environmental governance as powerful and precarious.

Increased interest in oceans is leading to new and renewed global governance efforts directed toward ocean issues in areas of food production, biodiversity conservation, industrialization, global environmental change, and pollution. Global oceans governance efforts face challenges and opportunities related to the nature of oceans and to actors involved in, the scale of, and knowledge informing their governance. We review these topics generally and in relation to nine new and emerging issues: small-scale fisheries (SSFs), aquaculture, biodiversity conservation on the high seas, large marine protected areas (LMPAs), tuna fisheries, deep-sea mining, ocean acidification (OA), blue carbon (BC), and plastics pollution.

ABSTRACT. This article contributes to a recent and growing body of literature exploring the nature of fieldwork in human geography. Specifically, we critically examine the role of gatekeepers in providing access to “the field,” based on existing conceptualizations of gatekeepers in the literature and on our own experiences with gatekeepers. We argue that the concept of gatekeepers has been oversimplified, in that relationships between researchers and gatekeepers are often assumed to be unidirectional—with gatekeepers controlling or providing access by researchers—and predominantly static in form and time. Although we accept the necessity and advantages of working through gatekeepers, our experiences suggest that relationships with them are highly complex and evolve over time, with sometimes unexpected implications for research. In gathering and analyzing data, researchers become gatekeepers themselves, what we are calling “keymasters.” Reconceptualizing the gatekeeper‐researcher relationship will contribute to ongoing efforts to more fully understand field‐workers as undertaking a practice inherently political, personal, and linked to the production of knowledge.

No abstract

No abstract

In this article, we examine oceans outcomes from the Third United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (or Rio+20) in relation to how ocean problems and solutions were defined and by whom. We highlight the extent to which problem and solution definitions were shared among participants, in relation to three specific issues on the agenda at Rio+20: conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, small-scale fisheries, and ocean acidification. We find that discussions about each of these issues reflect three challenges recognized as complicating oceans management: mismatches between ecological and governance scale, homogeneity among interest groups advocating for ocean conservation, and increased interest in both protection and exploitation of ocean resources. Overall, we found little evidence of constructive dialogue at Rio+20, where participants focused on advancing predefined positions, and we consider the implications of our analysis for ultimately addressing our three focal issues and for oceans management more generally.