Social cognition is a topic of enormous interest and much research, but we are far from having an agreed taxonomy or factor structure of relevant processes. The aim of this review is to outline briefly what is known about the structure of social cognition and to suggest how further progress can be made to delineate the in(ter)dependence of core sociocognitive processes. We focus in particular on several processes that have been discussed and tested together in typical and atypical (notably autism spectrum disorder) groups: imitation, biological motion, empathy, and theory of mind. We consider the domain specificity/generality of core processes in social learning, reward, and attention, and we highlight the potential relevance of dual-process theories that distinguish systems for fast/automatic and slow/effortful processing. We conclude with methodological and conceptual suggestions for future progress in uncovering the structure of social cognition.

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Highlights• Current approaches to measuring camouflaging appear to measure two distinct but potentially related elements of camouflaging, namely, 'camouflaging intent' and 'camouflaging efficacy'.• Adults with more self-reported autistic traits report greater engagement in camouflaging.• Sex and gender differences exist in camouflaging.• Higher self-reported camouflaging is associated with worse mental health outcomes.• Study designs are limited by poor participant characterisation and representativeness.

Individuals with autism spectrum conditions have difficulties in understanding and responding appropriately to others. Additionally, they demonstrate impaired perception of biological motion and problems with motor control. Here we investigated whether individuals with autism move with an atypical kinematic profile, which might help to explain perceptual and motor impairments, and in principle may contribute to some of their higher level social problems. We recorded trajectory, velocity, acceleration and jerk while adult participants with autism and a matched control group conducted horizontal sinusoidal arm movements. Additionally, participants with autism took part in a biological motion perception task in which they classified observed movements as ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. Results show that individuals with autism moved with atypical kinematics; they did not minimize jerk to the same extent as the matched typical control group, and moved with greater acceleration and velocity. The degree to which kinematics were atypical was correlated with a bias towards perceiving biological motion as ‘unnatural’ and with the severity of autism symptoms as measured by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule. We suggest that fundamental differences in movement kinematics in autism might help to explain their problems with motor control. Additionally, developmental experience of their own atypical kinematic profiles may lead to disrupted perception of others’ actions.

Catecholamines modulate the impact of motivational cues on action. Such motivational biases have been proposed to reflect cue-based, ‘Pavlovian’ effects. Here, we assess whether motivational biases may also arise from asymmetrical instrumental learning of active and passive responses following reward and punishment outcomes. We present a novel paradigm, allowing us to disentangle the impact of reward and punishment on instrumental learning from Pavlovian response biasing. Computational analyses showed that motivational biases reflect both Pavlovian and instrumental effects: reward and punishment cues promoted generalized (in)action in a Pavlovian manner, whereas outcomes enhanced instrumental (un)learning of chosen actions. These cue- and outcome-based biases were altered independently by the catecholamine enhancer melthylphenidate. Methylphenidate’s effect varied across individuals with a putative proxy of baseline dopamine synthesis capacity, working memory span. Our study uncovers two distinct mechanisms by which motivation impacts behaviour, and helps refine current models of catecholaminergic modulation of motivated action.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.22169.001

Recent work suggests that we are better at interpreting the movements of others who move like us, and that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) move in a quantifiably different way from typical individuals. Therefore, 'social impairments' exhibited by individuals with ASD may, at least in part, represent a failure by typical individuals to infer the correct mental states from the movements of those with ASD. To examine this possibility, individuals with ASD and typical adults manually directed two triangles to generate animations depicting mental state interactions. Kinematic analysis of the generated animations demonstrated that the participants with ASD moved atypically, specifically with increased jerk compared to the typical participants. In confirmation of our primary hypothesis, typical individuals were better able to identify the mental state portrayed in the animations produced by typical, relative to autistic individuals. The participants with ASD did not show this 'same group' advantage, demonstrating comparable performance for the two sets of animations. These findings have significant implications for clinical assessment and intervention in ASD, and potentially other populations with atypical movement.

Previous studies have demonstrated that when we observe somebody else executing an action many areas of our own motor systems are active. It has been argued that these motor activations are evidence that we motorically simulate observed actions; this motoric simulation may support various functions such as imitation and action understanding. However, whether motoric simulation is indeed the function of motor activations during action observation is controversial, due to inconsistency in findings. Previous studies have demonstrated dynamic modulations in motor activity when we execute actions. Therefore, if we do motorically simulate observed actions, our motor systems should also be modulated dynamically, and in a corresponding fashion, during action observation. Using magnetoencephalography, we recorded the cortical activity of human participants while they observed actions performed by another person. Here, we show that activity in the human motor system is indeed modulated dynamically during action observation. The finding that activity in the motor system is modulated dynamically when observing actions can explain why studies of action observation using functional magnetic resonance imaging have reported conflicting results, and is consistent with the hypothesis that we motorically simulate observed actions.

Avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (ARFID) was recently introduced to psychiatric nosology to describe a group of patients who have avoidant or restrictive eating behaviours that are not motivated by a body image disturbance or a desire to be thinner. This scoping review aimed to systematically assess the extent and nature of the ARFID literature, to identify gaps in current understanding, and to make recommendations for further study. Following an extensive database search, 291 unique references were identified. When matched against pre-determined eligibility criteria, 78 full-text publications from 14 countries were found to report primary, empirical data relating to ARFID. This literature was synthesised and categorised into five subject areas according to the central area of focus: diagnosis and assessment, clinical characteristics, treatment interventions, clinical outcomes, and prevalence. The current evidence base supports ARFID as a distinct clinical entity, but there is a limited understanding in all areas. Several possible avenues for further study are indicated, with an emphasis placed on first parsing this disorder's heterogeneous presentation. A better understanding of the varied mechanisms which drive food avoidance and/or restriction will inform the development of targeted treatment interventions, refine screening tools and impact clinical outcomes.