In the present paper, we investigate dehumanization processes from a victim perspective. We propose that dehumanization experiences, that is metadehumanization, arise from people's feelings that their fundamental human needs are thwarted and that such experiences influence their emotions, self-esteem, and coping strategies. Our model is put at test in three contexts involving different types of dehumanization victims: Women (Study 1a, N = 349), patients with severe alcohol use disorder (Study 1b, N = 120), and employees in organizations (Study 1c, N = 347). Our integrated model of metadehumanization, which considers both its antecedents and consequences, proved stable across contexts and populations and therefore helps building bridges between different psychological disciplines in which dehumanization occurs.
The present work investigated associations of older people with humanness. Focusing on complementary approaches (attribute-based, metaphor-based, and target-based), 4 studies tested the hypothesis that older people are the targets of animalistic dehumanization. Using an emotional attribution task, Study 1 (N = 112) explored infrahumanization and shows that young participants attributed more uniquely human emotions to young people than to older ones. No such effect occurred with regards to nonuniquely human emotions. Results of Study 2 (N = 62) replicated this result using a lexical-decision task. Using the metaphor-based approach, Study 3 (N = 99) confirmed that older people's dehumanization is restricted to its animalistic form and does not extend to the mechanistic one. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 167), we used a target-based approach and showed that characteristics initially attributed to older people are perceived as denoting lesser humanness than when these same characteristics are associated with younger people. Results of the 4 studies provide evidence for an animalistic form of dehumanization of older people by younger ones. Limits, implications, and future research are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record
Previous research has shown that discriminated women blame themselves more than they blame discrimination when meritocracy values are salient. In two studies, we examined whether meritocracy values also influence female observers when they judge a female victim of sexism. Such values were expected to lead them to judge more positively a victim incriminating herself than a victim claiming discrimination. Conversely, social equality values should lead them to judge more positively a victim claiming discrimination. Women who were either feminists or non-feminists (Study 1) or who were exposed to either social equality values or personal merit values (Study 2) had to judge a female victim of sexism who ascribed what happened to discrimination or to her ability. Feminist women and women exposed to social equality judged the female victim more positively when she reported discrimination than when she incriminated herself. The reverse pattern of judgement was observed for non-feminist women and women exposed to meritocracy values. The importance of values is discussed to improve the image of women claiming sexism.
Outgroup perpetrators of discrimination are perceived as more biased than ingroup perpetrators, potentially because perpetrator group membership drives inferences regarding their motivation to discriminate. Consequently, when outgroup perpetrators provide hostile justification, greater discrimination and illegitimacy will be perceived compared to when ingroup perpetrators do so. In contrast, benevolent justifications reduce differences in discrimination and illegitimacy perception for outgroup versus ingroup perpetrators. In two experiments (Ns = 243; 382) dealing with sexism and racism, results supported our reasoning that the perpetrator’s explicit justification moderates the influence of the perpetrator’s group membership on discrimination and illegitimacy perception. Results of a third experiment (N = 489) show that when no justifications are provided, the prototype effect on discrimination perception mirrors the prototype effect under hostile justification, but not under benevolent justification. The results are more mixed concerning perceived illegitimacy. We discuss the implications of these findings regarding the processes underlying the prototype effect.
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