Abstract. Correlation power-analysis (CPA) attacks are a serious threat for cryptographic device because the key can be disclosed from data-dependent power consumption. Hiding power consumption of encryption circuit can increase the security against CPA attacks, but it results in a large overhead for cost, speed, and energy dissipation. Masking processed data such as randomized scalar or primary base point on elliptic curve is another approach to prevent CPA attacks. However, these methods requiring pre-computed data are not suitable for hardware implementation of real-time applications. In this paper, a new CPA countermeasure performing all field operations in a randomized Montgomery domain is proposed to eliminate the correlation between target and reference power traces. After implemented in 90-nm CMOS process, our protected 521-bit dual-field elliptic curve cryptographic (DF-ECC) processor can perform one elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) in 4.57ms over GF (p 521 ) and 2.77ms over GF (2 409 ) with 3.6% area and 3.8% power overhead. Experiments from an FPGA evaluation board demonstrate that the private key of unprotected device will be revealed within 10 3 power traces, whereas the same attacks on our proposal cannot successfully extract the key value even after 10 6 measurements.
Abstract-Recently, several hardware implementations for elliptic curve cryptography have been proposed but few of them considered the dual-field functions, real-time requirement, hardware efficiency, and power analysis resistance as a whole. In this paper, a new unified division algorithm and a free pre-computation scheme are introduced to accelerate the GF (p)/GF (2 n ) elliptic curve arithmetic functions. The overall hardware is optimized by a very compact Galois field arithmetic unit with the fully pipelined technique. Moreover, a key-blinded technique with regular calculation is designed against the power analysis attacks without degrading clock speed. After fabricated in 90nm CMOS 1P9M process, our ECC processor occupied 0.55mm 2 can perform the scalar multiplication in 19.2ms over GF (p521) and 8.2ms over GF (2 409 ), respectively.
Nowadays, differential power-analysis (DPA) attacks are a serious threat for cryptographic systems due to the inherent existence of data-dependent power consumption. Hiding power consumption of encryption circuit or applying key-blinded techniques can increase the security against DPA attacks, but they result in a large overhead for hardware cost, execution time, and energy dissipation. In this brief, a new DPA countermeasure performing all field operations in a randomized Montgomery domain is proposed to eliminate the correlation between target and reference power traces. After implemented in 90-nm CMOS process, our protected 521-bit dual-field elliptic curve (EC) cryptographic processor can perform one EC scalar multiplication in 8.08 ms over GF (p 521 ) and 4.65 ms over GF (2 409 ), respectively, with 4.3% area and 5.2% power overhead. Experiments from a field-programmable gate array evaluation board demonstrate that the private key of unprotected device will be revealed within 10 3 power traces, whereas the same attacks on our proposal cannot successfully extract the key value even after 10 6 measurements.Index Terms-Dual fields, elliptic curve (EC) cryptography (ECC), power-analysis attacks, security system.
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