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Considerable research has demonstrated the power of the current positive or negative frame to shape people's current judgments. But humans must often learn about positive and negative information as they encounter that information sequentially over time. It is therefore crucial to consider the potential importance of sequencing when developing an understanding of how humans think about valenced information. Indeed, recent work looking at sequentially encountered frames suggests that some frames can linger outside the context in which they are first encountered, sticking in the mind so that subsequent frames have a muted effect. The present research builds a comprehensive account of sequential framing effects in both the loss and the gain domains. After seeing information about a potential gain or loss framed in positive terms or negative terms, participants saw the same issue reframed in the opposing way. Across 5 studies and 1566 participants, we find accumulating evidence for the notion that in the gain domain, positive frames are stickier than negative frames for novel but not familiar scenarios, whereas in the loss domain, negative frames are always stickier than positive frames. Integrating regulatory focus theory with the literatures on negativity dominance and positivity offset, we develop a new and comprehensive account of sequential framing effects that emphasizes the adaptive value of positivity and negativity biases in specific contexts. Our findings highlight the fact that research conducted solely in the loss domain risks painting an incomplete and oversimplified picture of human bias and suggest new directions for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record

Humans evolved to attend to valence and group membership when learning about their environment. The political domain offers a unique opportunity to study the simultaneous influence of these two broad, domain-general features of human experience. We examined whether the pervasive tendency for negatively valenced frames to "stick" in the mind applies to both intergroup and intragroup political contexts. In a pre-registered experiment, we tested the effects of negative-to-positive (vs. positive-to-negative) reframing on people's candidate preferences, first in the absence of party cue information and then in two partisan contexts: an intergroup context (analogous to a U.S. general election between opposing political parties) and an intragroup context (analogous to a U.S. primary election between candidates of the same party). We observed a persistent negativity bias in reframing effects, even in the presence of party cues. The results pave the way for future research at the intersection of psychology and political science.

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