We examine how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Theory predicts that a broad wave of sentiment will disproportionately affect stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. We test this prediction by studying how the cross-section of subsequent stock returns varies with proxies for beginning-of-period investor sentiment. When sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high on smaller stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme-growth stocks, and distressed stocks, consistent with an initial underpricing of these stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these patterns attenuate or fully reverse. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions and are unlikely to reflect an alternative explanation based on compensation for systematic risks.

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.IN CORPORATE F INANCE, "equity market timing" refers to the practice of issuing shares at high prices and repurchasing at low prices. The intention is to exploit temporary f luctuations in the cost of equity relative to the cost of other forms of capital. In the efficient and integrated capital markets studied by Modigliani and Miller~1958!, the costs of different forms of capital do not vary independently, so there is no gain from opportunistically switching between equity and debt. In capital markets that are inefficient or segmented, by contrast, market timing benefits ongoing shareholders at the expense of entering and exiting ones. Managers thus have incentives to time the market if they think it is possible and if they care more about ongoing shareholders.In practice, equity market timing appears to be an important aspect of real corporate financial policy. There is evidence for market timing in four different kinds of studies. First, analyses of actual financing decisions show that firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when market value is high, relative to book value and past market values, and tend to repurchase equity when market value is low. 1 Second, analyses of long-run stock returns fol- 1 lowing corporate finance decisions suggest that equity market timing is successful on average. Firms issue equity when the cost of equity is relatively low and repurchase equity when the cost is relatively high. 2 Third, analyses of earnings forecasts and realizations around equity issues suggest that firms tend to issue equity at times when investors are rather too enthusiastic about earnings prospects. 3 Fourth, and perhaps most convincing, managers admit to market timing in anonymous surveys. Graham and Harvey~2001! find that two-thirds of CFOs agree that "the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was an important or very important consideration" in issuing equity, and nearly as many agree that "if our stock price has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is 'high'"~p. 216!. In that survey as a whole, equity market prices are regarded as more important than 9 out of 10 other factors considered in the decision to issue common stock, and more important than all 4 other factors considered in the decision to issue convertible debt.In this paper, we ask how equity market timing affects capital structure. The basic question is whether market timing has a short-run or a long-run impact. One expects at least a mechanical, short-run impact. However, if firms subsequently rebalance away the inf lue...

We study how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns. Copyright 2006 by The American Finance Association.

Investor sentiment, defined broadly, is a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand. The question is no longer whether investor sentiment affects stock prices, but how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects. One approach is "bottom up," using biases in individual investor psychology, such as overconfidence, representativeness, and conservatism, to explain how individual investors underreact or overreact to past returns or fundamentals. The investor sentiment approach that we develop in this paper is, by contrast, distinctly "top down" and macroeconomic: we take the origin of investor sentiment as exogenous and focus on its empirical effects. We show that it is quite possible to measure investor sentiment and that waves of sentiment have clearly discernible, important, and regular effects on individual firms and on the stock market as a whole. The top-down approach builds on the two broader and more irrefutable assumptions of behavioral finance -- sentiment and the limits to arbitrage -- to explain which stocks are likely to be most affected by sentiment. In particular, stocks that are difficult to arbitrage or to value are most affected by sentiment.