No abstract

Intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia on foreign exchange markets from 1983 to 1997 is conjectured to have been determined by exchange rate trend correction, exchange rate volatility smoothing, the U.S. and Australian overnight interest rate differentials, profitability and foreign currency reserve inventory considerations. Using Probit and friction models, we show that these factors were significant influences on intervention behaviour. Consistent with the constraint of intervening only when a clear trend is apparent, we find that above average measures of deviations from trend and of volatility muted the response of the Reserve Bank.

No abstract

We quantify how output risks are smoothed within Australia, and between Australia and New Zealand. About 85 percent of shocks were smoothed within Australia through credit and capital markets, with fiscal policy a source of dissmoothing after 1992. Risk-sharing between Australia and New Zealand was greater than within Europe, occurring mostly through credit markets. With fully integrated financial markets between Australia and New Zealand since 1960, the average welfare gain would be 2.7 percent of certainty-equivalent consumption over 50 years, although these gains favour New Zealand. Australia's gains are from the pooling of PPP risks. These potential gains were largely resolved by the deregulations and CER trade agreement of the early1980s.JEL classification: E32, F33

Intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia on foreign exchange markets from 1983 to 1997 is conjectured to have been determined by exchange rate trend correction, exchange rate volatility smoothing, the U.S. and Australian overnight interest rate differentials, profitability and foreign currency reserve inventory considerations. Using Probit and friction models, we show that these factors were significant influences on intervention behaviour. Consistent with the constraint of intervening only when a clear trend is apparent, we find that above average measures of deviations from trend and of volatility muted the response of the Reserve Bank.