There has been significant interest in understanding how the distribution of parental control over international joint ventures (IJV) influences IJV outcomes (e.g., parent conflict, survival, performance). Yet, the accumulation of research on the relationship between control structure and IJV outcomes has been somewhat inconclusive and even contradictory. We contribute to this research stream by developing an organizational justice-based contingency model relating parental control structure to parent conflict. We suggest that the level of conflict between IJV parents will depend on the consistencies between the control structure and parents’ contribution of proprietary resources, and between control structure and the parents’ abilities to effectively monitor operations. Our analysis of Vietnamese joint ventures provides some support for our model, and suggests that the relationship between parent control structure and IJV outcomes is perhaps more complex than previously thought. Journal of International Business Studies (2005) 36, 156–174. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400121

Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs. Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Drawing on the concept of relational embeddedness and the associated mechanisms of mutual understanding, trust, and commitment, we examine how leaders' prior exchange experiences influence the likelihood of subsequent interorganizational exchange. We begin to develop a microlevel model of organization-level relations that accounts for nodal multiplexity. In data on baseball player trades, we found that individual leaders' ties affected exchanges less than did an organization's other ties. The sharing of exchange experiences by organizations and their current leaders increased the influences of those experiences on exchange behavior. Thus, leaders have more influence within their organizational contexts than in isolation.

Although international joint ventures (IJVs) may mature over time and develop competitive viability, they maintain some risk of instability owing to their shared ownership. Such instability can ultimately lead to their internalization by one of the partners. In this study, we consider factors that influence (1) whether IJVs evolve toward becoming a wholly owned subsidiary, and (2) which parent (foreign or local) gains ownership of the venture. We use a sample of Hungarian joint ventures, and find that only when there is both a power imbalance between the parents and high levels of conflict is the likelihood that the joint venture converts to a wholly owned subsidiary enhanced. The extent to which the joint venture has learned from the foreign parent indirectly determines which parent gains full ownership. Extensive knowledge transfer to a joint venture in a transitioning economy combined with high levels of conflict increases the likelihood of the foreign parent gaining full ownership. In contrast, when there is extensive knowledge transfer and low conflict between the parents, the local parent is more likely to internalize the venture. Our results suggest that the relationship between partner power and outcomes in ventures is more complex than originally believed, and is contingent upon the level of conflict between the parents of the IJV. Journal of International Business Studies (2008) 39, 491–507. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400341