What resources and technologies are strategic? Policy and theoretical debates often focus on this question, since the "strategic" designation yields valuable resources and elevated attention. The ambiguity of the very concept, however, frustrates these conversations. We offer a theory of when decision makers should designate assets as strategic based on the presence of important rivalrous externalities for which firms or military organizations will not produce socially optimal behavior on their own. We distill three forms of these externalities, which involve cumulative-, infrastructure-, and dependency-strategic logics. Although our framework cannot resolve debates about strategic assets, it provides a theoretically grounded conceptual vocabulary to make these debates more productive. To illustrate the analytic value of our framework for thinking about strategic technologies, we examine the US-Japan technology rivalry in the late 1980s and current policy discussions about artificial intelligence.In March 2018, when the Office of the US Trade Representative released its Section 301 report 1 on China's unfair trade practices-one of the first volleys in a trade war-astute observers noted that the report singled out one Chinese technology plan: "Made in China [zhongguo zhizao] 2025." Amid the bluster of tariffs on steel and soybeans, these analysts understood that "Made in China 2025," which prioritized ten "strategic industries [zhanl€ ue chanye]," posed the "real existential threat to U.S. technological leadership." 2 Indeed, competition over "strategic" goods and technologies has
Major theories of military innovation focus on relatively narrow technological developments, such as nuclear weapons or aircraft carriers. Arguably the most profound military implications of technological change, however, come from more fundamental advances arising from ‘general-purpose technologies’ (GPTs), such as the steam engine, electricity, and the computer. Building from scholarship on GPTs and economic growth, we argue that the effects of GPTs on military effectiveness are broad, delayed, and shaped by indirect productivity spillovers. We label this impact pathway a ‘general-purpose military transformation’ (GMT). Contrary to studies that predict GPTs will rapidly diffuse to militaries around the world and narrow gaps in capabilities, we show that GMTs can reinforce existing balances if leading militaries have stronger linkages to a robust industrial base in the GPT than challengers. Evidence from electricity's impact on military affairs, covering the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, supports our propositions about GMTs. To probe the explanatory value of our theory and account for alternative interpretations, we compare findings from the electricity case to the military impacts of submarine technology, a non-GPT that emerged in the same period. Finally, we apply our findings to contemporary debates about artificial intelligence, which could plausibly cause a profound GMT.
executive summary: This essay examines the growing role of China in international standards-setting organizations as a window into its efforts to influence global digital governance institutions and highlights areas where the U.S. can preserve its interests in cyberspace. main argument In recent years China's international influence in shaping the digital rules of the road has increased. Evidence of the country's growing role in digital standards-setting organizations comes from increased numbers of submissions to key international technical standards bodies as well as enhanced Chinese representation in leadership positions in these bodies. This trend is evident in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, which provide opportunities for China to lead in the formulation of new systems of standards. At the same time, it is important to avoid overstating the country's role in global digital governance. China's standards-setting influence is qualified by the caliber of its submissions and by comparison with other leading countries. policy implications • The U.S. must recognize that China is becoming a more important player in setting international standards for digital technologies, and that this trend comes with both risks and benefits. • To bolster U.S. industry participation in international standards-setting, the U.S. can provide more support for hosting international standards gatherings and for U.S. subject matter experts to participate in standards-setting forums. • International standards-setting organizations can also take steps to check undue Chinese government influence, such as by strengthening anonymous voting procedures.
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