A unique experiment has begun in Canada to address environmental protection by replacing adversarial relations with a nationwide multiparty collaboration involving all segments of society. An analysis of this experiment was conducted to inform our knowledge of the theory and practice of large-scale collaboration. The negotiated order perspective espoused in recent collaboration theory at the interorganizational level was found to provide an adequate framework for analyzing collaboration at the societal level. This framework, however, must be recast in a social ecology perspective to account for the fact that supraorganizational collaboration processes are themselves embedded in larger social processes. Institutional economics is suggested as a model for further developments. In addition, two factors were found to be essential to the success of large-scale collaboration: the institutionalization of roundtables to mediate between philosophical ideals and practical problem solving, and the institutionalization of the principle of shared responsibility to provide the social bond necessary for the permanence of supraorganizational partnerships.

This study examines the outcomes of a large-scale Multistakeholder Collaborative Roundtable (MCR) on environmental protection. The findings shed a considerably more realistic light on the concrete outcomes of MCRs than does the image portrayed by the literature and some practitioners. We observed that consensus was achieved, albeit on general principles only. Various types of learning did occur, but they were limited to networking competencies. Problem solving was detected, albeit in the form of incremental innovation only. Overall, the major result of the MCR studied was that it contributed “small wins” to its initial grand objective. The case illustrates the paradox of MCRs. It teaches us that we should be cautious about their real potential to help solve complex collective problems. Yet, it shows that MCRs do serve a useful purpose, that of giving direction to “metaproblems, ” a result that apparently can hardly be attained otherwise.

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This paper presents a dynamic model of acquisition strategy and applies it to the case history of a large engineering ®rm. The paper uses the notion of`dominant logic' ®rst put forward by Prahalad and Bettis (1986) to explain how the ®rm's acquisition strategy and management approach evolved. It is suggested that the core activities and history of the ®rm led to the development of a management approach that emphasized individual autonomy and development, ad hoc structural arrangements, a short-term focus, and¯exibility and opportunism. These characteristics persisted over time and tended to inhibit both commitment to intended strategies and extension of core competencies. At the same time, this logic encouraged opportunistic acquisitions which snowballed into a major new strategic thrust. It is concluded: (a) the ®rm's`dominant logic' rooted in core activities and in the history of a ®rm can be used to explain its acquisition management behaviour; (b) the more malleable elements of a dominant logic can be somewhat extended under the thrust of key managers, but permanent change will not occur as long as these shifts con¯ict with more immutable elements; (c) in a process of growth by acquisition, a ®rm will tend to preserve its unique dominant logic until the inconsistencies it creates are revealed in a crisis or series of crises. One mode of adjustment may then be to operate under more than one dominant logic to accommodate the ®rm's heterogeneity. INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH LITERATURE ON ACQUISITIONSMergers and acquisitions are among the most important and visible strategic decisions that a ®rm can make. It is therefore not surprising that researchers have been preoccupied with questions of whether, when, why and how acquisitions pay. In general, however, the results of this research have been rather pessimistic concerning the ability of acquisitions to create value for acquirers and somewhat inconclusive concerning the factors associated with success or failure.

This article examines how employees form their perceptions of managerial responsibility in a concrete organizational setting. Drawing on negotiated order theory, it shows that these perceptions are the result of complex processes of social construction and negotiation, rather than the application of predetermined ethics models or norms. Employees' perceptions appear to be unstable; they are subject to constant alterations, fluctuating with the organizational circumstances, and are likely to create considerable organizational perturbations, especially when managers make complex and ambiguous decisions. This process is illustrated through an ethnographic study that analyzed the evolution of employee perceptions during a three-year crisis-one that led managers to repeatedly postpone salary payments to save jobs. The process approach adopted by the study highlights important dynamics that traditional business ethics approaches overlook, such as the fragility of the construct of managerial responsibility, which cannot be coherent unless it is constantly renegotiated among an organization's various employee groups.