This paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992. We use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures. Both unadjusted and market-adjusted results show signif icant increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, output, employment level, and dividends. We also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios. Our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firmlevel variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.
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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firmlevel variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.
Terms of use:
Documents in
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