No abstract

To contribute to the PCAOB project on auditing fair value measurements (FVMs), we synthesize relevant academic literature to offer insights, conclusions, and future research directions for auditors, standard-setters, and academics focusing on auditing FVMs. We structure our synthesis along two dimensions: (1) an emphasis on the auditor's need to understand how FVMs are prepared, and (2) the audit steps and procedures necessary to verify and attest to FVMs, including an awareness of the potential biases inherent in auditing FVMs. Drawing primarily from the judgment and decision-making literature, we highlight a number of potential biases and limitations in the preparation and audit of FVMs. Additionally, we note that the specialized valuation knowledge necessary to effectively audit FVMs will be difficult for auditors to gain and maintain.

Prior research shows that an audit supervisor’s active intervention in a subordinate’s judgment distorts that judgment. However, subordinates’ judgments are only one input into audit team judgments. How do supervisors finalize audit team judgments after actively intervening in their subordinates’ judgments? In an experiment using audit teams, supervisors with weaker or stronger goals to reach a client-preferred conclusion either were or were not asked to first actively coach a subordinate’s judgment (i.e., active intervention) before reviewing it and finalizing the audit team’s judgment. Supervisors’ intervention influenced subordinates’ inputs, which, in turn, supervisors incorporated into their final judgments. More interestingly, intervention biased supervisors’ final judgments, controlling for supervisor directional goal strength and for concurrent effects on subordinates’ inputs. However, supervisors distorted their judgments less as they perceived a larger technical knowledge advantage over subordinates. In a second experiment, auditors appear aware of the bias-reducing knowledge advantage effects but unaware of the bias-increasing active intervention effects. We discuss implications for audit team judgments and audit quality control.

Regulation requires auditors to raise significant audit issues and concerns to the attention of audit engagement leadership and requires leadership to encourage such communication. This research demonstrates, using an experiment and a survey, that audit team members' willingness to speak up about such issues is associated with their intrinsic motivational orientation. Based on this result, we test whether audit leadership can leverage this relationship to increase speaking up, particularly when audit issues are more ambiguous, by emphasizing intrinsic goals. Results across three additional experiments indicate that auditors whose leaders emphasize intrinsic goals, whether directly or through tone at the top and firm culture, are more likely to speak up than are other auditors. We also find that auditors are more likely to speak up when an audit issue is less versus more ambiguous. We conclude that leadership can fulfill their obligation to encourage upward communication by emphasizing intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, regardless of the level of ambiguity surrounding the audit issue.

Strategic-systems auditing (SSA) approaches require auditors to perform analyses of their clients at two levels (i.e., strategic and business-process levels) when conducting audits (e.g., Bell et al. 2002; Lemon et al. 2000). One advantage of using SSA approaches is that through these analyses, auditors gain a complex systems understanding of the client. This understanding enhances decision making in part by recognizing that small actions can have big effects that increase overall business risk (Jacobson 2001; Richmond 2000). This study examines how the two levels of analysis in SSA impact auditor judgments regarding small changes in a business process that can have big (risk-increasing) effects. Specifically, we predict that when strategic-positioning information (contained within the strategic-level analysis) indicates a client is typical of others in its industry, information at the business-process level regarding a small problem in a business process will be weighted less than when the strategic-positioning information indicates the client is atypical. Results support this contention. This behavior may have implications for the effectiveness of SSA approaches under certain conditions.