In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of 'homology' (similarity due to common descent) rather than 'analogy', or 'shared function', and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology rather than in terms of shared function. This poses a direct challenge to the dominant philosophical view of how to define psychological categories, viz., 'functionalism'. Although the implications of this position extend to all psychological traits, the debate has centered around 'emotion' as an example of a psychological category ripe for reinterpretation within this new framework of classification. I address arguments by Griffiths that emotions should be divided into at least two distinct classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and that these two classes require radically different theories to explain them. Griffiths argues that while basic emotions in humans are homologous to the corresponding states in other animals, higher cognitive emotions are dependent on mental capacities unique to humans, and are therefore not homologous to basic emotions. Using the example of shame, I argue that (a) many emotions that are commonly classified as being higher cognitive emotions actually correspond to certain basic emotions, and that (b) the ''higher cognitive forms'' of these emotions are best seen as being homologous to their basic forms.
This chapter offers a selective survey of the contributions that evolutionary anthropology (EA) can make to research in evolutionary psychology (EP). Drawing on paleoanthropology, we underscore the importance of phylogeny in understanding adaptations, including the kludgy nature of many, and the conflicts that arise among them. This approach underscores the trait‐specific nature of environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs), directing attention to the differential phylogenetic depth of different adaptations. Paleoanthropology is complemented by studies of small‐scale societies, demonstrating, for example, that social dynamics in such groups indicate that mechanisms governing human cooperation likely did not stem from kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Central to anthropology is the recognition of the variation in ecologies and social structures characteristic of humans. Such variation selects for adaptations that either facultatively adjust output in light of local environment, or facilitate cultural acquisition. We examine the parasite‐stress theory (PST) account of cross‐cultural variation in light reconstructions of past societies, arguing against a strong evoked‐culture explanation, and in favor of a transmitted‐culture account wherein learning mechanisms are hijacked by cultural evolution. We close by discussing (a) ways to interpret cross‐cultural variation or uniformity; and (b) contributions of EP to EA. Finally, we offer a brief roadmap for applying EA in EP.
Tracy, Shariff, and Cheng (2010) propose that human pride has two facets (hubristic pride [HP] and authentic pride [AP]) which, despite their similarities, diverge in important ways, including their evolutionary histories and functions. Put simplistically, AP emerged from HP. While AP and HP are thus homologous, HP continues to exist in humans, alongside AP. This is problematic on the most common interpretation of homology, in which an ancestral trait transforms into a derived trait, but does not remain present independently. I suggest that construing HP and AP as serial homologues (duplicated but varying traits within single organisms) solves this problem, and also resolves some of the other tensions in their account of pride as a “single” emotion with “two” facets.
Recently, many critics have argued that disgust is a morally harmful emotion, and that it should play no role in our moral and legal reasoning. Here we defend disgust as a morally beneficial moral capacity. We believe that a variety of liberal norms have been inappropriately imported into both moral psychology and ethical studies of disgust: disgust has been associated with conservative authors, values, value systems, and modes of moral reasoning that are seen as inferior to the values and moral emotions that are endorsed by liberal critics. Here we argue that the meta-ethical assumptions employed by the critics of disgust are highly contentious and in some cases culture bound. Given this, we should avoid adopting simplified meta-ethical positions in experimental moral psychology, as these can skew the design and interpretation of experiments, and blind us to the potential value of moral disgust harnessed in the service of liberal ends. Keywords Disgust Á Moral psychology Á Liberal Á Conservative values Á Emotion 1 Introduction Recently, a growing number of philosophers, legal scholars and scientists have evaluated the role of disgust in moral judgments, and have found it wanting. They argue that features intrinsic to the emotion itself lead to immoral judgments, or unethical treatment of its objects. Nussbaum
This study presents findings with a particular digital library system, the Belgian-American Research Collection at the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center (UWDCC). It focuses on the ways in which a usability study can inform the future design of the collection and other UWDCC projects. The study uses two formal testing instruments: a focus group and a task-oriented field test. Both of these techniques yielded solid data about user expectations, problems and actions with the collection. While the findings can aid UWDCC designers as they begin to envision another iteration of the Belgian-American Research Collection, the findings also point to a need for a shift in the development of more complete digital library systems. This study proposes the development of digital library systems that have a strong orientation toward users and usability as well as advanced search interfaces and full metadata. In the end, it is not just about cataloging and organizing information; it is also about presenting information logically and intuitively for your users.
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